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I. INTRODUCTION 
Through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), 1 Congress intended to provide increased legal remedies for 
participant-beneficiaries2 who are denied benefits from private employee 
benefit programs. To achieve this goal, Congress provided new federal 
remedies under federal causes of action that are tried in both federal and 
state courts. 3 
Following ERISA's passage, the federal courts, ever hostile to the 
jury trial that legal remedies entail, have endeavored to thwart this goal. 
Two facts have aided the federal courts' efforts: (1) ERISA lacks an ex-
press provision permitting jury trials in lawsuits by participant-benefi-
ciaries;4 and (2) employee benefit programs generally consist of two 
components-trusts and contracts5-which have radically different im-
pacts when determining whether the right to a jury trial exists. Unfortu-
nately, employee benefit law has yet to develop a theoretical legal 
independence from the body of law that relates to those two strands. 
Consequently, federal courts can depict employee benefit programs as 
trusts, a subject for the equity courts, and thereby deny a jury trial in an 
ERISA action. 6 
• Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas; B.A., 
1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E., 1969, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D., 1975, University of Texas at Austin. 
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). 
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988) 
(civil action may be brought against employers and fiduciaries who have violated Act). See 
infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text for the congressional statement. 
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
4. Id. § 502 (a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B); see Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & 
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 828 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 
(1981). 
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)-(4), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)-(4); see infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions under Section 
502(a){l){B) of ERISA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 737, 739 (1983); see also infra notes 130-66 and 
accompanying text. 
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In contrast, state courts early characterized employee benefit pro-
grams as contracts, a subject for the law courts, thereby granting a right 
to jury trial in an ERISA action.7 Juries typically respond more favora-
bly to participant-beneficiaries than to the predominantly corporate 
sponsors of the employee benefit programs. 8 
Thus, whether a participant-beneficiary obtains a jury trial for re-
view of his or her benefit claim denial depends on the forum selected by 
the participant-beneficiary and whether the plan administrator permits 
him or her to remain in that forum. 
This Article outlines the statutory scheme that permits the dual ju-
risdiction over ERISA lawsuits for benefits and explains the significance 
of a jury trial to the participant-beneficiary's lawsuit.9 This Article then 
discusses the principles used to determine whether the right to a jury trial 
exists and reviews the approaches of the appellate courts, emphasizing 
the failure of the federal circuit courts to properly resolve the jury trial 
issue. 10 Next, this Article provides the analysis that courts should use to 
determine whether a participant-beneficiary has a right to a jury trial. 11 
This Article asserts that both ERISA and relevant constitutional 
provisions require a jury trial in lawsuits by participant-beneficiaries re-
lating to their employee benefits. 12 This eliminates a motive for forum 
shopping and fosters the congressional goal of providing increased legal 
remedies for participant-beneficiaries. 
II. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
A. Employee Benefit Programs in General 
ERISA generally applies to two types of employee benefit programs: 
welfare plans and pension plans. 13 These employee benefit programs 
generally involve four parties: (1) the employer, who makes contribu-
tions to the plan and appoints both the plan administrator and the 
7. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 13-112 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 113-93 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 194-311 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text. 
13. Welfare plans provide benefits in the nature of medical, disability, death, severance, 
vacation or education benefits. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3(l)(A), 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988). A pension plan provides retirement income or deferred in-
come. Id. § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). There are two types of pension plans: (1) the "defined 
contribution plan" or "individual account plan" for which the plan document specifies the 
annual contribution, id. § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34); and (2) the "defined benefit plan," id. 
§ 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35), for which the plan document specifies the amount of the retire-
ment benefit. 
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trustee; 14 (2) the plan administrator, who administers the plan; 15 (3) the 
trustee, who invests the plan's funds; 16 and (4) the participant-benefici-
ary, who receives the benefits.17 A single party may serve in more than 
one of these four roles. 18 The employer, plan administrator and trustee 
are all plan fiduciaries. 19 
There are usually four separate types of plan administrators: (1) an 
employer;20 (2) a management employee, a committee of such persons, or 
a committee dominated by such persons;21 (3) a service provider, such as 
an insurance company operating under an administrative contract with 
the plan;22 and ( 4) a committee with an equal number of representatives 
from management and rank and file employees.23 Only the latter type of 
plan administrator can be disinterested, 24 or at least truly balanced.25 
14. Id. § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5)(B); id. § 3(16),.29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). 
15. Id. § 3(16)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). 
16. Id. § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
17. Id. § 3(6)-(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)-(8). See generally Robert A. Frei & James G. 
Archer, Taxation & Regulation of Pension Plans Under the LR.C, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 691, 692-
93 (discussing four parties in context of their role in pension plans and relevant tax 
consequences). 
18. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
19. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 3(21), 403, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1002(21)(A), 1103(a) (1988); see, e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 323 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5103 ("[F]iduciaries include officers and direc-
tors of a plan, members of a plan's investment committee and persons who select these 
individuals."). 
20. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3(16)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(16)(A)(ii) (employer plan administrator if none named). 
21. See, e.g., Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1987) (committee of executive 
employees); Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Indus., 814 F.2d 620, 622 (11th Cir. 1987) (director 
of personnel); Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 
521, 535 (7th Cir. 1986) (committee of management employees), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 
(1987); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1985) (director of 
personnel). 
22. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 441-42 
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (stating insurer with authority to deny or grant claims is fiduciary under 
ERISA); Schulist v. Blue Cross, 553 F. Supp. 248,252 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same), aff'd, 717 F.2d 
1127 (7th Cir. 1983); Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1980) (stating 
service provider acting as claims administrator could be fiduciary if it had ultimate responsibil-
ity for claims determinations). 
23. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 186(c)(5)(B) (1988) (specifying membership of trustee for jointly administered union plan). 
24. Plan administrators that have an interest in the outcome of their decision must satisfy 
a higher decisional standard than those not so interested. See infra notes 71-79 and accompa-
nying text. The federal courts have long applied the disinterested decisional standard to the 
jointly administered union plan. See, e.g., Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1962) 
(treating this type of administrator as disinterested). 
25. See George L. Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 
CATH. L. REv. 133, 174-75 (1990); see also Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (ERISA "contemplates fiduciaries with dual loyalties" and this arrangement 
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Employee benefit programs divide into two types: single-employer 
plans in which the firm sponsors a plan only for its employees, and multi-
ple-employer plans in which several firms together sponsor one plan for 
all of their employees.26 Most multiple-employer plans are multi-em-
ployer plans maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement 
with a union, designed to benefit the labor union members of the in-
volved employers. 27 
Employee benefit programs that are not multi-employer plans ordi-
narily consist of two separate instruments, both of which govern the ben-
efit program.28 The plan instrument which is in the form of a contract 
defines the rights and duties of the employer, the plan administrator, and 
the third-party beneficiaries of the contract, namely the participant-bene-
ficiaries. The plan is executed by the employer and initial plan adminis-
trators.29 A trust instrument, in the form of a trust document, defines 
the rights and duties of the employer and trustee with respect to the as-
sets of the benefit program, and is executed by the employer and initial 
trustee.30 Sometimes, both instruments appear in the same document ex-
ecuted by the employer, the initial plan administrators, and the initial 
trustee.31 Multi-employer plans also usually have two instruments: (1) 
the collective bargaining agreement (a contract); and (2) an instrument, 
labeled a trust document, that establishes a board of trustees, 32 defines 
the board's duties, and covers the affairs of both the trust and the plan. 33 
is "an unorthodox departure from the common law rule against dual loyalties"), aff'd as modi-
fied, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). 
26. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 48 
(1990). 
27. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3(37)(A), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(37)(A) (1988); EMPLOYEE BENEFITS REsEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EM· 
PLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 55-59 (3d ed. 1987). 
28. See, e.g., Molumby v. Shapleigh Hardware Co., 395 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1965) (plan and trust in separate instruments); see also John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court 
Flunks Trusts, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 207, 223 (Gerhard Casper et al. eds., 1991) (pointing out 
that ERISA does not supplant either trust law or contract law relating to employee benefit 
programs). 
29. E.g., 5A JACOB J. RABKIN & MARK JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX 
ANALYSIS (MB) 13-1001 to -0021 (1991) (defined benefit program's plan instrument, Form 
13.01, without separate trust instrument). 
30. E.g., id. at 13-1074 to -1083 (trust instrument for defined benefit program, Form 
13.03(11)). 
31. E.g., id. at 13-2045 to -2077 (profit-sharing plan and trust, so labeled, in one docu-
ment, Form 13.13). 
32. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) 
(1988). 
33. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS REsEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 27, at 55-59. The Board typ-
ically hires a salaried plan administrator and staff or an outside administration firm to handle 
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B. Nongovernmental Civil Actions and Jurisdiction 
Two federal statutes provide most of the regulation of employee 
benefit programs: the Labor Management Relations Act of 194 7 
(LMRA)34 and ERISA. 35 
1. LMRA regulation 
Government regulation of multi~employer plans and single~em~ 
ployer, union~negotiated plans began with LMRA. This Act primarily 
regulates collective bargaining agreements. 36 LMRA has two provisions 
of significance to employee benefit programs. 
LMRA section 302(c)(5) mandates that employee benefit programs 
conform to three requirements. First, union officials can only participate 
in plan administration and fund management as members of a board of 
trustees on which both labor and management are equally represented. 37 
As a result of this requirement, labor unions have developed two types of 
employee benefit programs: (1) programs administered jointly by both 
union and management pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, 
exempted from LMRA provisions proscribing payment to union officials; 
and (2) programs resulting from the collective bargaining process admin~ 
istered unilaterally by employers and subject to the proscription. 38 Con~ 
day-to-day matters. /d. So even multi-employer plans separate plan administration from asset 
management. 
34. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 
u.s.c. §§ 141-187 (1988)). 
35. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). 
36. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
37. /d. § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). 
In the employee benefit area, LMRA attempted to eliminate the extortion, bribery and 
mismanagement plaguing union pension and welfare programs by controlling their establish-
ment and operation. Eliot A. Landau et al., Protecting a Potential Pensioner's Pension-An 
Overview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees' Fiduciary Obligations and Vesting, 40 
BROOK. L. REv. 521, 535-41 (1974). Congress also became concerned that union officials 
might convert program resources to their own use and, through LMRA, made it illegal to set 
up a program administered solely by a union. /d. at 535. 
38. See Randy J. Schneider, Surviving ERISA Preemption: Pension Arbitration in the 
1980's, 16 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 269, 275-78 (1980). Both types settled disputes 
through arbitration prior to ERISA. /d. at 276. 
Unilaterally administered plans are of two types. One type is the subject of a collective 
bargaining agreement. But an employer can also establish an employee benefit plan outside of 
the collective bargaining agreement for union employees when it is not the subject of the col-
lective bargaining agreement with the union. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, § 1014(a), 26 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1988) (special rules for collectively bargained plans); 26 
C.F.R. § 1.413-1(a)(2) (1991). Since employee benefit plans are mandatory subjects of negotia-
tion, these plans result when the employer and union fail to agree on a collectively bargained 
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sequently, the jointly administered multi-employer plans possess a 
disinterested plan administrator. 39 
Second, LMRA section 302(c)(5) requires that programs be funded 
by a trust.40 Third, this part of LMRA requires the trustees of multi-
employer plans to operate them for the sole and exclusive benefit of the 
participant-beneficiaries. However, this requirement contains no en-
forcement mechanism.41 Instead, courts have implied a number of non-
governmental, civil actions.42 Federal jurisdiction for these cases de-
pends on a sufficient structural violation of section 302(c)(5).43 Under 
this provision employers, participant-beneficiaries and trustees have sued 
to enforce fiduciary duties;44 participant-beneficiaries have also used this 
provision to sue for benefits due under multi-employer plans.45 
plan. See, e.g., Allied Chern. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 
180-81 (1971). 
39. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
40. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(A) 
{1988). 
41. Id. (prohibiting employer payments to labor unions except for payments to employee 
trust funds for sole and exclusive benefit of employees and beneficiaries). 
42. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
43. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-10 (1989). Examples of suffi-
cient structural violations are when the trust has an unevenly balanced joint administration, 
the trust is not established solely to benefit employees, the trust does not have an annual audit 
or the trust does not set forth a detailed basis for paying benefits. See Bowers v. Ulpiano 
Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1968); Landau et al., supra note 37, at 538-39. 
44. See, e.g., Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 1977) (pensioners 
sued trustees to make plan whole for failure to get employer contributions), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1013 (1978); Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 165 (9th Cir.) (former union members 
who had withdrawn from plan sought transfer of moneys contributed on their behalf), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (2d Cir. 1975) (new 
trustees sued old trustees to invalidate self-dealing contract); Quad City Builders Ass'n v. Tri 
City Bricklayers Union No. 7, 431 F.2d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 1970) (builder's association sued 
for violation of administrator balance); Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58, 75 (8th Cir. 1965) 
(employers challenged use of trust property to run pharmacy offering discounts to 
nonbeneficiaries); Employing Plasterers' Ass'n v. Journeymen Plasterers' Protective & Benevo-
lent Soc'y Local No. 5, 279 F.2d 92, 97-99 (7th Cir. 1960) (employers sued trustees to enjoin 
plan administrator's misuse of funds for political contributions); Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 
1228, 1232 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (employee challenged break-in-service provision in plan); Porter v. 
Teamsters Health, Welfare & Life Ins., 321 F. Supp. 101, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (union members 
sued trustees for diversion of trust funds); Giordani v. Hoffman, 295 F. Supp. 463, 471-72 
(E.D. Pa. 1969) (union members sued for improprieties in administration of trust fund); Bath 
v. Pixler, 283 F. Supp. 632, 635-36 (D. Colo. 1968) (trustees sued to determine disposition of 
health and welfare funds on termination of old trust to establish new trust); Raymond v. Hoff· 
mann, 284 F. Supp. 596, 598-99 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (trustees of new local sued trustees of old 
union plan for aliquot portion of reserves); accord Bowers, 393 F.2d at 426 (jurisdiction lack-
ing without allegation of violation of section for trustees who sued non parties for diversion of 
funds). 
45. See, e.g., Johnson v. Botica, 537 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1976) (former employee sued 
to challenge denial of disability pension); Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of the Illumina-
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LMRA section 30l(a) provides specific causes of action to enforce 
contracts under collective bargaining agreements.46 Courts consider em-
ployee benefit plans to be this type of contract.47 Therefore, LMRA sec-
tion 301(a) applies to both multi-employer and single-employer, union-
negotiated employee plans. Under this interpretation trustees, as parties 
to the contract, have sued employers for contributions,48 and participant-
beneficiaries, as third party-beneficiaries of the contract, have sued for 
benefits due49 and to rectify breaches of various fiduciary duties. 50 Both 
state and federal courts have jurisdiction for lawsuits under sections 301 
tion Prods. Indus., 529 F.2d 251, 254-56 (2d Cir.) (former employee sued for declaration and 
injunctive relief for denial of disability pension), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976); Pete v. 
United Mine Workers Welfare & Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (D.C. Cir.) (for-
mer employee sued to review pension benefit denial), reh'g granted, 517 F.2d 1274 (1974); 
Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1244 (D.C. Cir.) (class action brought to review denial of 
pension benefits), reh'g granted sub nom. Kiser v. Boyle, 517 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744,745 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (union member sued trustees to determine 
eligibility for pension), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964). 
46. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301(a), 29 U.S. C. § 185(a) (1988) ("Suits 
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in 
any district court" without meeting amount in controversy and diversity requirements.). 
47. See infra notes 256-61 and accompanying text. 
48. See, e.g., Clark v. Kraftco Corp., 510 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1975) (trustees sued 
employer for delinquent contributions); Lewis v. Seanor Coal Co., 382 F.2d 437, 439 (3d Cir. 
1967) (same), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968); Lewis v. Owens, 338 F.2d 740, 740 (6th Cir. 
1964) (same); Calhoun v. Bernard, 333 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1964) (same); Pennington v. 
United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1963) (same), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 949 
(1965); Lewis v. Lowry, 322 F.2d 453, 454 (4th Cir. 1963) (same); Lewis v. Mears, 297 F.2d 
101, 102 (3d Cir. 1961) (same), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 873 (1962); Local No. 90 Stove Mount-
ers' Union v. Welbilt Corp., 178 F. Supp. 408,409 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (union sued employer to 
compel employer's payments to pension fund), aff'd, 283 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1960). 
49. See, e.g., Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1976) (widow sued trust-
ees for survivor's benefits); Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258, 268 (6th Cir. 1965) 
(former employee sued for denied pension benefit); Rhine v. Union Carbide Corp., 343 F.2d 
12, 15 (6th Cir. 1965) (former employee sued for denied disability benefit); United Auto. 
Workers v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 1963) (union action on behalf of employ-
ees to determine their rights in terminated plan); Hayes v. Morse, 347 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 
(E.D. Mo. 1972) (former employee sued trustees for pension benefit), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1265 (8th 
Cir. 1973); Brune v. Morse, 339 F. Supp. 159, 159 (E.D. Mo. 1972) (same), aff'd, 475 F.2d 858 
(8th Cir. 1973); Knoll v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 325 F. Supp. 666, 668 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (action by 
former employees to discontinue pension fund and distribute assets to beneficiaries upon clos-
ing of plant), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); accord 
Allied Chern. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 176-77 n.17 
(1971) (dictum in unfair labor practice case); Beam v. International Org. of Masters, 511 F.2d 
975, 978 (2d Cir. 1975) (spouse of deceased union member sought denied accidental death 
benefits). 
50. See, e.g., Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 1977) (pensioners 
sued trustees for not exercising trustees' rights under employee benefit plan), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1013 (1978); Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 161-64 (9th Cir.) (former union members 
who had withdrawn from plan sought transfer of moneys contributed on their behalf), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United Steelworkers v. Butler, 439 F.2d 1110, 1111 (8th Cir. 
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and 302.51 
2. ERISA regulation 
The more comprehensive regulation of these collectively bargained 
plans and most of the remaining single-employer plans began with 
ERISA. 52 For these plans ERISA specifies reporting and disclosure 
1971) (union sued on behalf of employees for wrongfuily paid insurance premiums under 
health plan). 
51. The LMRA provision for lawsuits on union contracts states only that these suits "may 
be brought" in federal court, Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185(a) (1988), so a litigant may also bring the lawsuit in state court, Charles Dowd Box Co. 
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962). 
Litigants have brought suits in state court to enforce contribution requirements to coiiec-
tive bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Reeves v. Arizona Aggregate Ass'n Health & Welfare 
Fund, 435 P.2d 829, 830 (Ariz. 1967) (trustees sued to recover contributions); Barbers Local 
552, Journeymen Barbers Int'l Union v. Sealey, 118 N.W.2d 837, 838 (Mich. 1962) (union 
sued for specific performance compeiiing contributions); List Indus. Corp. v. Gelber, 175 
N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (trustees sued to recover contribution); Northwest Adm'rs., 
Inc. v. Wildish Sand & Gravel Co., 552 P.2d 547, 548 (Or. 1976) (trustees sued to enforce 
payments by employer); Trust Fund Serv. v. Heyman, 550 P.2d 547, 548 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1976) (trustee suit to compel contributions to pension plan), aff'd, 565 P.2d 805, cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 987 (1977). Participant-beneficiaries have also sued in state court for benefits due. 
See, e.g., Atlantic Steel Co. v. Kitchens, 187 S.E.2d 824, 825 (Ga. 1972) (former employee 
sued for retirement benefits); Hoffman v. Cross, 183 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (former 
employees sued for retirement benefits); Forrish v. Kennedy, 105 A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. 1954) (for-
mer employee sued trustees for retirement pension); Garrity v. United Mine Workers Welfare 
& Retirement Fund of 1950, 43 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 7216 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 1960) (retired 
union members sued trustees for pension benefits), aff'd, 170 A.2d 117 (1961). 
The LMRA provision for employee plans states that federal courts "shaii have jurisdic-
tion •.. to restrain violations of this section." Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
§ 302(e), 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1988). Congress drafted this provision, however, to avoid the 
anti-injunction requirements of the Norris-Laguardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 
(1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988)). See 93 CONG. REC. S4678 
(1947) (statement of Sen. Ball). As a result, courts have claimed that state jurisdiction also 
exists for restraining violations. See, e.g., Nixon v. O'Callaghan, 392 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (removal of case for benefits due when statute required state jurisdiction for 
removal; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1988) (state jurisdiction no longer required)); Butchers' 
Union Local229 v. Cudahy Packing Co., 66 Cal. 2d 925, 932, 428 P.2d 849, 852, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
713, 716 (1967) (union sued to compel employer to arbitrate pension eligibility); Cox v. Supe-
rior Court of San Bernardino County, 52 Cal. 2d 855, 859, 346 P.2d 15, 19 (1959) (denied writ 
of prohibition against employer's enforcement of breaches of fiduciary duties). 
52. ERISA contains provisions favorable to participants in coiiectively bargained, multi-
employer plans. These provisions preserve participation and benefit rights for a highly mobile 
workforce on a union- or industry-wide basis. Changing employment between employers in-
cluded in the plan does not interrupt accrual of benefits and vesting. Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, § 1014, 26 U.S.C. § 413(c)(3) (1988); see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2530.203-3 (1991) (distinguishing between multi-employer plans and other plans on this ba-
sis). The regulations apply the nondiscrimination tests for employee coverage as if a single 
employer employed the employees of ail employers subject to the same benefit computation 
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requirements, 53 participation and vesting requirements, 54 funding re-
quirements55 and fiduciary standards. 56 
ERISA differs from LMRA by specifically providing for express ac-
tions with jurisdictional limits. Section 502(a) of ERISA authorizes sev-
eral types of express, nongovernmental, civil lawsuits by plan fiduciaries 
and participant-beneficiaries: (1) a participant-beneficiary suit for infor-
mation;57 (2) a participant-beneficiary or fiduciary suit (a) to enjoin viola-
tions of ERISA or the plan, (b) to obtain other equitable relief to redress 
such violations, or (c) to enforce ERISA's or the plan's provisions;58 and 
(3) a participant-beneficiary lawsuit "to recover benefits due [the partici-
pant-beneficiary] under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce his rights 
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits 
under the terms of the plan."59 Unlike LMRA, under the jurisdictional 
provision of ERISA, all litigants must bring suit in federal court except 
participant-beneficiaries suing for benefits, or the enforcement or clarifi-
cation of rights, all provided under the plan and not ERISA. 60 The latter 
litigants may sue either in federal or state court. 61 
formula under the plan. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 1014, 26 
U.S. C. § 413(b){l); 26 C.F.R § 1.413-1(b) (1990). 
53. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-
1031 (1988). 
54. /d. §§ 201-211, 29 u.s.c. §§ 1051-1061. 
55. /d. §§ 301-306, 29 u.s.c. §§ 1081-1086. 
56. /d.§§ 401-414, 29 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1114. 
57. /d. § 502(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S. C. § 1132(a)(1)(A)(c) (relief provided by § 1132(c) to par-
ticipant-beneficiary for failure to provide information required by ERISA upon request); see 
also id. § 502(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4) (appropriate relief to participant-beneficiary for 
violation of§ 1025(c) requiring annual statement to participant of vested benefit). 
58. /d. § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (equitable relief for participant-beneficiary or 
fiduciary for violations or to enforce statute and plan); H.R CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 
19, at 323, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5107 (actions involving breach of fiduciary duty 
and to enforce or clarify benefit rights provided under statute); see also Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988) (fiduciary liability to plan for 
breach of fiduciary duty); id. § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S. C. 1132(a)(2) (appropriate relief for partici-
pant-beneficiary or fiduciary under § 1109). 
59. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 323, reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5107 (actions to enforce benefit rights under plan or to recover benefits under 
plan not involving statute). 
In any ERISA action the court may award reasonable attorney's fees. Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). 
60. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(e)(1), (a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(e)(1), (a)(l)(B). 
61. /d. § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). 
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C. Participant Preference for State Court 
The jury issue under ERISA typically arises in the context of the 
benefits-due lawsuit. Participant-beneficiaries desiring benefits from em-
ployee benefit programs normally apply to plan administrators or their 
designees, 62 who rule on the application. 63 Plans ordinarily provide plan 
administrators with discretion in making these decisions. 64 ERISA con-
templates this discretion65 and pre-ERISA law all but mandated it.66 
Tax law once indirectly mandated discretion in benefit payment. 67 State 
law indirectly mandated discretion in plan interpretation. 68 
62. Any designee of a plan administrator is also a fiduciary. Id. § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(21)(A); 29 C.P.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(2) (1991); see supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
63. ERISA provides that the plan administrator must have procedures for making a claim, 
communicating any denial to the participant-beneficiary and appealing the decision. Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988); 29 C.P.R. 
§ 2560.503-1 (1991). 
64. See Langbein, supra note 28, at 220-23 (suggesting that after 1988 all properly drafted 
plans will provide discretion because of the United States Supreme Court's review rule); see 
also infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
65. ERISA defines a plan administrator as an entity with discretion in the administration 
of the plan. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) 
(1988). The significance of the discretion presently deals with the courts' review standard for 
the decision, because of a misreading of the Supreme Court's directive by the circuit courts. 
The misreading involves the courts' application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in all 
cases involving discretion, rather than the abuse of discretion standard, of which the arbitrary 
and capricious standard is one part and de novo review the other part. See infra notes 11-79 
and accompanying text. One commentator, speaking for those draftsmen who risked legal 
malpractice by ignoring pre-ERISA law and the proper drafting of ERISA plans, concluded 
that the Supreme Court's directive will mandate the discretion. See Langbein, supra note 28, 
at 220. ERISA plans based on forms from the pre-ERISA law generally have that discretion. 
See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 787 (8th Cir. 1944) (action of board in all re-
spects to be final and conclusive, the typical pre-ERISA language granting discretion). 
66. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
67. The estate tax code defined a taxable lump sum to include an amount payable as a 
lump sum distribution at the election of the recipient. 26 U.S.C. § 2039(c) (1983) (relating to 
exemption from estate taxes for payments from qualified retirement plans other than lump 
sums), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1852(a)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 
2085, 2868. Plan administrator discretion concerning payment method destroyed that taxable 
election. The income tax code included in taxable income those amounts paid or made avail-
able by a retirement plan. 26 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1980), amended by Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 311(c)(1), 314(c)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 277 (to delete availability 
language). Plan administrator discretion concerning payment times destroyed that taxable 
availability. 
68. Several early decisions by courts held that, absent fraud, courts could not review a plan 
administrator's decision if the plan provided that the plan administrator had discretion to 
determine eligibility and other matters under the plan and that such decision was conclusive. 
See, e.g., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (under trust theory for LMRA plan); Clark v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 
N.E. 348, 351 (Mass. 1918) (under contract theory for employee benefit plan); McNevin v. 
Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (App. Div. 1898) (under gratuity theory for employee 
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If the plan administrator denies the application, the participant-ben-
eficiary must first appeal the decision to the plan administrator. 69 If the 
plan administrator does not reverse the decision, the participant-benefici-
ary may sue for recovery of benefits in either federal or state court.70 
1. Two approaches to the decision's review 
Ordinarily, the issue for the courts in the benefits-due lawsuit is the 
review of the plan administrator's discretionary decision. The United 
States Supreme Court, in dicta, has mandated that courts conduct this 
review under the abuse of discretion standard of trust law.71 This stan-
dard consists of essentially two parts: (1) the deferential (to the plan 
administrator) arbitrary and capricious standard for the disinterested 
plan administrator with proper motives; 72 and (2) de novo review for 
disinterested plan administrators with improper motives and for inter-
ested plan administrators. 73 
Which abuse of discretion review standard applies depends on the 
type of plan administrator. The disinterested, properly-motivated plan 
administrator fails the deferential arbitrary and capricious test when he 
benefit plan), aff'd, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901). Without that discretionary provision, courts 
applied the usual contract construction rule, which requires that courts construe the contract 
against the employer-draftsman. Compare Menke, 140 F.2d at 791 (discretion so not con-
strued against draftsman) with Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1937) (no discretion so construed against draftsman). Writers of retirement plans 
could avoid problems of poor draftsmanship by providing the plan administrator with the 
discretion to interpret the plan and determine conclusively any controversy between the plan 
and the participant-beneficiary. 
69. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 503(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) 
(1988); 29 C.P.R. § 2560.503-1 (1991). 
70. /d. § 502(a)(1)(B), (e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § ll32(a)(1)(B), (e)(1). The participant-benefici-
ary must exhaust the plan's appeal procedure before bringing the benefit denial to a court. See, 
e.g., Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs. Group Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Merritt v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 1034, 1035 (11th Cir. 1989); Wolfv. National 
Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 1984); Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 
567-68 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Curry v. Contract Fabricators Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 891 
F.2d 842, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1990) (exception to exhaustion when resort to administrative pro-
cess is futile); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 727 F.2d 177, 180-85 (8th Cir. 1984) (ex-
ception to exhaustion of remedies rule for retirees who are not owed duty of fair representation 
by union), cert denied, 411 U.S. 1102 (1985). 
71. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (dealing with plan not 
granting plan administrator discretion); see also Langbein, supra note 28 (suggesting Supreme 
Court drew review principle from wrong body of law). This Article agrees. However, the 
review principle is the same under either the trust law used by the Supreme Court or the 
contract law used by Langbein and this Article. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. 
72. See, e.g., 1 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 cmt. e (1959). 
73. See, e.g., id. § 187 cmt. g; see also Flint, supra note 25, at 168-72 (explaining applica-
tion of this standard to plan administrators). 
372 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:361 
or she fails to have one of several logical reasons and some evidence to 
support his or her decision. 74 The disinterested, improperly motivated 
plan administrator is one who decides from an improper motive other 
than self-dealing, such as hatred, and is also described as acting in "bad 
faith."75 The interested plan administrator is one who decides from a 
dishonest motive, such as self-dealing, and is described as acting in "bad 
faith. "76 These latter two types of plan administrators fail de novo re-
view when their decision disagrees with the judicial fact finder's 
decision. 77 
Since only plan administrators of multi-employer plans are cur-
rently disinterested, the de novo review should apply to most plans. 78 
Most courts, however, continue to use the deferential arbitrary and capri-
cious standard in all benefits-due lawsuits involving a review of the plan 
administrator's decision. 79 
The Supreme Court's standard of review is the same as that used 
under contract law. 80 As is the case with any area of developing law 
dealing with a new instrument, courts have struggled with employee ben-
efits law in an effort to determine which previously existing bodies of law 
should provide a basis of analogous rules. As the plan instruments are 
essentially founded on two bodies of law-contract law and trust law-
each with a different nature, courts have eventually considered employee 
benefit programs as either one or the other. As contracts rarely provide 
for discretionary decisions, 8 I courts which consider employee benefit pro-
74. Flint, supra note 25, at 140-43, 169-70. 
75. Id. at 172 n.186. 
76. Id. at 170-71. 
77. See, e.g., id. at 167-72. Post-Bruch cases have failed to follow this rule since they 
interpret Bruch as denying de novo review in the presence of discretion. See, e.g., In re Gulf 
Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1181 (S.D. Tex. 1991). 
78. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
79. E.g., Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694 (6th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1924 (1990); McConnell v. Texaco, 727 F. Supp. 751, 756 (D. Mass. 
1990); Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 1338, 1340-41 (D. Minn. 1989); 
O'Dom v. GCIU Supplemental Retirement & Disability Funds, 722 F. Supp. 365, 370-71 
(S.D. Ohio 1989). 
The Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch held that in the absence of discretion, 
ERISA mandated de novo review. 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In dicta, the Supreme Court 
indicated that if the plan provided discretion to the plan administrator the trust review stan-
dard of abuse of discretion applied. Id. 
80. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. 
81. See, e.g., 3A ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 644, at 78 (1964) (explain-
ing that such provisions must be clearly expressed or courts will not enforce them); see also 
Clark v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 N.E. 348, 351 (Mass. 1918) (finding analogous 
provision to pension plan's discretion provision only in buyer's satisfaction clauses in sales 
contracts and architects' approval clauses in construction contracts). 
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grams to be contractual in nature have analogized them to construction 
contracts with a provision for an architect's certificate of progress, 82 or to 
sales contracts with a provision for buyer's satisfaction. 83 But whether 
82. See infra note 84. 
Construction contracts often contain a provision that an architect or engineer will conclu-
sively determine the sufficiency of the contractor's work. Under this provision the architect or 
engineer supervises the work and issues a certificate of progress under which the owner pays 
the contractor. Courts review the architect's or engineer's decision under a standard contain-
ing both tests of the abuse of discretion standard, namely, a test for a logical reason when 
properly motivated (the arbitrary and capricious standard) and a test for improper motive 
when improperly motivated (the de novo review standard). See, e.g., Public Water Supply 
Dist. No. 8. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 478 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Mo. 1972) (applying de novo 
review), modified on other grounds, 513 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1974); Travis-Williamson County 
Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Page, 358 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) 
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 367 
S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1963). The architect's or engineer's decision is final and binds the parties 
unless in rendering a decision he or she acted fraudulently or made such a gross mistake as to 
imply bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest judgment. E.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. 
Wilson-Avery, Inc., 156 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (architect upheld); James I. 
Barnes Constr. Co. v. Washington Township, 184 N.E.2d 763, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962) (engi-
neer overruled on conflicting evidence); Public Water Supply Dist. No. 8, 478 S.W.2d at 296 
(engineer upheld); Antrim Lumber Co. v. Bowline, 460 P.2d 914, 921, 923 (Okla. 1969) (engi-
neer overruled as evidence sustained jury finding of measurement error); Travis-Williamson, 
358 S.W.2d at 162 (engineer overruled as evidence sustained jury finding of failure to issue 
certificate for substantial completion when only needed clean-up and adjustment work); see 
Ruckman & Hansen, Inc. v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 244 A.2d 277, 278 (Del. 1968) 
(Director of Authority); O.K. Johnson Elec. v. Hess-Martin Corp., 464 P.2d 206, 210-11 
(Kan. 1970) (in dicta, architect overruled as decision outside scope of clause); City of Balti-
more v. Allied Contractors, 204 A.2d 546, 552 (Md. 1964) (Director of Public Works); Henry 
B. Byors & Sons v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 264 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass. 1970) (in dicta, 
architect overruled as decision outside scope of clause); see also 1 REsTATEMENT OF CoN-
TRACI'S § 303(b)-(t) (1932) (listing instances in which condition precedent requiring archi-
tect's certificate will be excused). 
Failure to exercise an honest judgment is equivalent to "arbitrary and capricious" action. 
E.g., Tobin Quarries v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 64 F. Supp. 200, 207 (D. 
Neb.) (court not to uphold architect or engineer for an arbitrary action), a.ff'd, 157 F.2d 482 
(8th Cir. 1946); Clack v. State Dep't of Pub. Works, 275 Cal. App. 2d 743, 747, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
274,276-77 (1969) (engineer's arbitrary act without reason gross error, not bad faith); Edward 
Edinger Co. v. Willis, 260 Ill. App. 106, 121 (1931) (arbitrary non-action by architect is fraud); 
Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County Sewer Auth., 113 A.2d 787, 799 (N.J. 1955) (engi-
neer's arbitrary action without reason is fraud); Savin Bros. v. State, 405 N.Y.S.2d 516, 519 
(App. Div. 1978) (no indication that engineer's acts were unreasonable so as to constitute bad 
faith), aff'd, 393 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1979); Goodrum v. State, 158 S.W.2d 81, 86-87 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1942) (court will not uphold architect or engineer for acting capriciously, arbitrarily or 
fraudulently); accord Huey v. Davis, 556 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (upholding 
architect approval in land covenant), rev'd on other grounds, 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1978); see 
41 U.S.C. § 321 (1990) (government officer decision in government contract conclusive, unless 
fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith or not 
supported by substantial evidence). 
83. See infra note 84. 
Sales contracts sometimes have a condition that the goods will be satisfactory to the 
buyer, thereby qualifying the buyer's obligation to purchase. A court reviews the buyer's dis-
374 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:361 
the court used the contractual approach or the trust approach, the review 
standard for the discretionary decision was still the same. Thus, the 
abuse of discretion review standard for employee benefit programs has a 
dual origin: contract law84 and trust law.85 Even the plan document 
cretionary decision under a standard containing both tests of the abuse of discretion standard. 
Courts interpret this provision in such commercial contracts to require satisfaction in good 
faith and after an exercise of an honest judgment. E.g., Meredith Corp. v. Design & Lithogra-
phy Ctr., 614 P.2d 414, 417 (Idaho 1980) (printed advertising); Frankfort Distilleries v. Burns 
Bottling Mach. Works, 197 A. 599, 602 (Md. 1938) (bottle labeling machine); Alper Blouse 
Co. v. E. E. Connor & Co., 127 N.E.2d 813, 815 (N.Y.), reh'g denied, 130 N.E.2d 598 (N.Y. 
1955) (nylon cloth); Fulcher v. Nelson, 159 S.E.2d 519, 522 (N.C. 1968) (automobile); 2 RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 228 cmt. a (1981). 
84. In the seminal state case concerning review of a plan administrator's discretionary 
decision under the contract approach, Clark v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 N.E. 348 
(Mass. 1918), the court analogized the plan, comprised solely of employer contributions and 
administered by an employer-appointed plan administrator, to a construction contract with a 
provision for an architect's or engineer's certificate, or a sales contract with a provision for 
buyer's satisfaction. Id. at 349. Under these types of contractual provisions one party would 
provide the building or goods to the satisfaction of the architect, engineer or buyer. Following 
the precedent for these provisions, see supra notes 82-83, the court concluded that it would 
overturn the plan administrator's discretionary decision only after finding evidence of "want of 
good faith." /d. at 350. This is the second test of the abuse of discretion standard. 
Many subsequent state courts adopted this contractual approach and viewed Clark as 
controlling the situation, frequently adding the other test of the abuse of discretion standard. 
See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Robertson, 225 S.W. 649, 652-53 (Ark. 1920) (no evi-
dence of bad faith); Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 133 A.2d 894, 897 (Conn. 1957) (whim); 
Schwartz v. Century Circuit, Inc., 163 A.2d 793, 796 (Del. Ch. 1960) (fraud, bad faith and the 
like); Van Pelt v. Berefco, Inc., 208 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (fair and reasonable 
but uses bad faith test); Norman v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 322 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Ky. 
1959) (bad faith); Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 194 N.E. 441, 443 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) 
(whim or caprice); Moore v. Postal Tel-Cable Co., 24 S.E.2d 361, 363 (S.C. 1943) (fraud or 
bad faith but court uses unreasonableness test); Long v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 442 
S.W.2d 462, 466-67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (fraud and bad faith); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. 
Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (good faith); Dowling v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 
80 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (not subject to attack in court except upon showing 
of fraud or bad faith). Some state courts followed Clark even when viewing the situation as a 
gratuity. See Spiner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 
(not subject to attack in court absent actual fraud or bad faith). Other state courts have used 
the lack of good faith rule without an indication of its source. See Paddock Pool Constr. Co. 
v. Monseur, 533 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Bos v. United States Rubber Co., 100 
Cal. App. 2d 565, 570, 224 P.2d 386, 388 (1950). Therefore, under the contractual approach, 
the review standard comprises both tests of the abuse of discretion standard. 
85. Another approach adopted by the courts considers the employee benefit plan as a trust 
and applies trust law. Trust law also mandates use of the abuse of discretion standard to 
review a trustee's discretionary decision. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 (1959). 
This standard also applies when the trustee has discretionary authority to interpret the trust 
instrument. E.g., Taylor v. McClave, 15 A.2d 213, 215 (N.J. Ch. 1940); GEORGE G. BOGERT 
ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 559, at 169-71 (1980). 
Most state courts use the contractual approach. See infra note 208 and accompanying 
text. However, following the trust law precedent, a few state courts concluded that they would 
overturn the plan administrator's discretionary decision only after finding evidence of want of 
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interpretive standard was the same under either contract law86 or trust 
law.87 The court thus should use the same review and interpretation 
good faith or an absence of a reasonable judgment. E.g., Leigh v. Estate of Leigh, 284 
N.Y.S.2d 991, 994-95 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (arbitrary or bad faith). 
The primary use of the trust law approach is in LMRA cases for purposes of reviewing 
plan administrator action only. LMRA specifically provides that the plans must be in trust 
form. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(A) 
(1988). So the federal and state courts considering a LMRA case usually follow the review 
standard of trust law. However, since they are generally dealing with disinterested plan ad-
ministrators, hopefully with proper motives, they describe the standard as the arbitrary and 
capricious rule. Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Kennet v. United Mine-
workers, 183 F. Supp. 315, 318 (D.D.C. 1960) (rule of Hobbs); Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 
346, 349 (D.D.C. 1958) (rule for noncharitable trust); Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 286-
87 (D.D.C. 1958) (rule for charitable trust); Barlow v. Roche, 161 A.2d 58, 63 (D.C. 1960) 
(citing AusnN W. Scorr, Scorr ON TRuSTS § 187 (2d ed. 1956)); Farrish v. Kennedy, 105 
A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. 1954) (good faith and within bounds of reasonable judgment). Courts dealing 
with LMRA cases, however, regard the plan as a contract, not a trust. See infra notes 255-69 
and accompanying text. 
So under the trust approach, the review standard comprises both tests of the abuse of 
discretion standard. 
86. Fact finders ordinarily construe ambiguous contracts against the drafter. Moulor v. 
American Life Ins. Co., 111 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1884) (insurance contract); Grace v. American 
Century Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 282 (1883) (same); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hercules Powder 
Co., 224 F.2d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 1955) (same). However, this rule does not apply when the plan 
administrator has interpretative discretion. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. In-
stead, the fact finder must use the abuse of discretion standard. See supra note 84 and accom-
panying text. 
87. To interpret trusts, courts generally use the construction rules applicable to written 
instruments, namely contracts, deeds and wills. See, e.g., Murphy v. Morris, 141 S.W.2d 518, 
520 (Ark. 1940); Storkan v. Ziska, 94 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ill. 1950); In reWork Family Trust, 
151 N.W.2d 490,492 (Iowa 1967); In re Hauck's Estate, 223 P.2d 707,710 (Kan. 1950); Hart 
v. First Nat'l Bank, 112 So. 2d 565, 567 (Miss. 1959); In re Mann's Estate, 56 N.W.2d 621, 
623 (Neb. 1953); Marks v. Southern Trust Co., 310 S.W.2d 435,437-38 (Tenn. 1958); William 
Buchanan Found. v. Shepperd, 283 S.W.2d 325, 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), rev'd on other 
grounds, 289 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. 1956). In the event of ambiguity, courts ordinarily construe 
the trust in favor of the beneficiary and against the settlor. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Bennett, 
420 F.2d 19, 24 (8th Cir. 1970) (Iowa law); Funsten v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 805, 808 (8th 
Cir. 1945) (Missouri law); Seasongood v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 486, 491 (S.D. Ohio 
1971) (Ohio law); Sale v. World Oil Co., 6 F. Supp. 321, 327 (N.D. Tex. 1933) (Texas law), 
aff'd sub nom. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Campbell, 69 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 
U.S. 648 (1934); In re Greenleaf's Estate, 101 Cal. App. 2d 658, 661-62, 225 P.2d 945, 948 
(1951); Lyman v. Stevens, 197 A. 313, 316 (Conn. 1938); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Clarke, 
178 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Mo. 1944); Osborn v. Bankers Trust Co., 5 N.Y.S.2d 211, 215 (Sup. Ct. 
1938); Damiani v. Lobasco, 79 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1951); McCollum v. Braddock Trust Co., 
198 A. 803, 805 (Pa. 1938); Wood v. Paul, 95 A. 720, 722 (Pa. 1915). But as with contract 
interpretation, this rule does not apply when the trustee has interpretative discretion. See 
supra notes 65-68. Instead, the fact finder must use the abuse of discretion standard. See 
supra note 85 and accompanying text. To the extent the interpretation of the trust instrument 
involves issues of fact, some courts have discretion to submit them to a jury. See Georgopolis 
v. George, 54 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Minn. 1952). 
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rules for benefits-due lawsuits regardless of whether courts and litigants 
treat the issues as arising under contract theory or trust theory. 
2. Two different jury trial results 
There is, however, a major difference between these two interpreta-
tional approaches when it comes to the right to trial by jury. Courts that 
consider benefits-due lawsuits contract-like, and therefore legal in na-
ture, 88 submit them to a jury trial, 89 while courts that regard them as 
88. Courts consider contract matters as legal in nature because in pre-1791 England, liti-
gants brought these actions under writs of assumpsit or debt, at law with trial by jury. JOHN 
H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 285-87 (2d ed. 1979). Conse· 
quently, an action for money damages from a breach of contract in federal court entitles one to 
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, see, e.g., Ross v. 
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970) (New York law; even when action for money damages 
coupled with equitable action for breach of fiduciary duty, action merits jury trial), as does an 
action for a declaratory judgment on the amount owing under a contract. An action brought 
for declaratory relief does not obscure the essentially legal nature of the underlying issues if the 
questions involved are traditional common law issues that should be submitted to a jury. See, 
e.g., Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) (Oklahoma law; jury trial granted for declara-
tory action); Johnson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 238 F.2d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1956) (Minnesota 
law). The same principal applies for an accounting under a contract for a money judgment. 
See, e.g., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1962) (Pennsylvania law; claim for 
amount due under contract wholly legal in nature thus jury trial mandated). The only con· 
tract action that is not legal in nature but equitable, and thus does not require a jury, is an 
action for specific performance through an injunction. See, e.g., Klein v. Shell Oil Co., 386 
F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1967) (Minnesota law); Rash v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 192 
F.2d 470, 471 (6th Cir. 1951) (Kentucky law), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 909 (1952). An action 
for rescission, not of interest to a benefits-due lawsuit, may be legal or equitable, depending on 
the remedy sought. 5 CORBIN, supra note 81, §§ 1102-1103, at 548-57. 
One contract matter ordinarily is left to the court and not the jury, namely, interpretation 
of the contract. E.g., Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1st Cir. 
1989) (Michigan law); Ingram Coal Co. v. Mower Ltd. Partnership, 892 F.2d 363, 365 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (West Virginia law); Technical Consultant Servs. v. Lakewood Pipe of Tex., Inc., 
861 F.2d 1357, 1362 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas law); Brookhaven Landscape & Grading Co. v. 
J.F. Barton Contracting Co., 681 F.2d 734, 735 (11th Cir. 1982) (Georgia law); Apponi v. 
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 652 F.2d 643, 651 n.l2 (6th Cir. 1981) (Ohio law; pension plan is 
contract). However, when the contract language is ambiguous, then a jury determines the 
parties' intent from evidence. See, e.g., Technical Consultant Servs., 861 F.2d at 1362 (submit· 
ting question of intent to jury); Brookhaven Landscape & Grading Co., 681 F.2d at 735; Ap· 
poni, 652 F.2d at 651 n.12; Nevets C.M., Inc. v. Nissho Iwai American Corp., 726 F. Supp. 
525, 531 (D.N.J. 1989) (New Jersey law), aff'd, 899 F.2d 1218 (3d Cir. 1990). But a court, not 
a jury, determines whether an ambiguity exists. E.g., Toren v. Braniff, Inc., 893 F.2d 763, 765 
(5th Cir. 1990) (Texas law); Fashion House, Inc., 892 F.2d at 1083; Apponi, 652 F.2d at 651 
n.12; PPG Indus. v. Shell Oil Co., 727 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. La. 1989) (Texas law); Nevets 
C.M., Inc., 126 F. Supp. at 531; Williams v. National Can Corp., 603 F. Supp. 1268, 1275 
(N.D. Ind. 1985) (Indiana law). Since benefits-due lawsuits frequently involve only plan inter-
pretation, see Flint, supra note 25, at 134 n.5, the employee-beneficiary might not obtain a jury 
trial under contract law without an ambiguity. 
89. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
January 1992] JURY TRIAL FOR ERISA BENEFIT CLAIMS 377 
trust-like, and therefore equitable in nature,90 will not submit them to a 
jury.91 
Most participant-beneficiaries fare better with a jury.92 Juries, an 
expression of democracy,93 are generally unsympathetic to large corpora-
tions94 and insurance companies,95 namely, the sometime plan sponsors 
and frequent plan administrators. However, federal courts have a history 
of hostility to the jury trial.96 Consequently, participant-beneficiaries file 
90. Courts consider trust matters generally as equitable in nature since in pre-1791 Eng-
land they were brought in the chancery court. BAKER, supra note 88, at 242-44. So courts try 
actions by beneficiaries involving trust matters without a jury, even when the only relief sought 
is the recovery of money. E.g., Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 479 (1901) (Illinois law); 
Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 228 (1872) (federal law); see Boone v. Wachovia 
Bank & Trust Co., 163 F.2d 809, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (trust matters are for court of equity); 1 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusrs §§ 197-198 (1959) (same). The exception to this rule is 
an action in the nature of money had and received to obtain money immediately and uncondi-
tionally due, which is legal and carries a right to a jury trial. /d.; see Transamerica Occidental 
Life Ins. Co. v. Digregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying rule to pension plan 
and trust to permit jury trial). 
91. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 44 (1988) (lawyers believe juries 
are more generous than judges for plaintiffs); HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE CoURT 72 
(1959) (study of personal injury suits in New York City in 1950 showed juries award on aver-
age twice as much money as judges). 
93. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 281,283 (Henry Reeve trans., 
1840) (jury places direction of society in hands of governed, not government); GUINTHER, 
supra note 92, at 27 (result of Bushel's case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 89 Eng. Rep. 2 (1670)); id. at 
220 (describing jury "as an instrument of the people to invoke changes in public policy and 
private conduct"); 7 THOMAS A. JEFFERSON, WRmNGS 422-23 (1903) (letter dated July 19, 
1789, explaining that it is better to have people affect execution of laws through juries than in 
making laws); 12 THOMAS A. JEFFERSON, PAPERS 425, 440, 558 (1955) (various letters 1787-
1788 expressing necessity of civil jury trial in Constitution to protect people's liberty); Patrick 
E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 
56 TEx. L. REv. 47, 58-60 (1977) (describing jury as democratic check on judicial power). 
94. See, e.g., GUINTHER, supra note 92, at xiv (explaining origins of anti-jury movement in 
allegedly high awards in judgments against businesses); MARK A. PETERSON, CIVIL JURY 
VERDICTS IN CooK CouNTY 35-37 (1984) (study of Chicago lawsuits indicated corporate de-
fendants pay two and one-half to four times more than do individuals when injuries are se-
vere); RAND CORPORATION, REPORT ON THE FIRST FOUR YEARS 20-21 (1984) (same, in San 
Francisco). 
95. Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 751 
(1958) (discussing mock jury experiment in which plaintiff's recovery is greater when jury is 
aware of defendant's insurance coverage); Philip D. Caldevone, Comment, Advertising the Eco-
nomics of High Jury Awards, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1175, 1185 (1980) (discussing insur-
ance industry's advertising campaign to counter high jury awards against insureds); see 
Michael A. Hatchell, Insurance Advertising: Much Ado about Nothing, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 
427, 428-35 (1979) (discussing Texas state law restrictions on interjecting matter of insurance 
in case); Thomas A. Vetter, Voir Dire IL· Liability Insurance, 29 Mo. L. REv. 305, 307-16 
(1964) (same, Missouri law). 
96. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 F. Supp. 1542, 1544-45 
(N.D. Ala. 1990); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 
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their benefits-due lawsuits in state court where they find the right to jury 
1990). Besides the ERISA lawsuit, the federal judicial system has engaged in three jury re-
strictive practices that some states have refused to follow, namely (1) the attempt to remove 
complex litigation from the jury, (2) the disallowance of conscience verdicts by juries, and (3) 
the failure to use the merger oflaw and equity to expand the right to a jury trial. Former Chief 
Justice Burger advocated a complexity exception to the right to a jury trial. Donald P. Lay, 
Can Our Jury System Survive, TRIAL, Sept. 1983, at 50. The federal system has used this 
exception. E.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 
1980); Las Vegas Sun Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 1979); Bernstein v. 
Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 65-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. 
v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-48 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 
420 F. Supp. 99, 103-04 (W.D. Wash. 1976); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 248-49 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Encyclopaedia Britannica ed. 1952) (advocating use of equity proceed-
ings for complicated matters). But see In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 424-
31 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying exception), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 
929 (1980). See generally Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush 
to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981) (advocating no resolution of issue due to lack of 
studies); Constance S. Huttner, Note, Unfit for Jury Determination: Complex Civil Litigation 
and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C. L. REv. 511 (1979) (arguing 
neither Seventh Amendment nor Due Process Clause provides constitutional justification for 
striking demands for jury trial in complex civil cases presenting legal claims). The exception is 
based on the idea that sophisticated business matters (especially accounting) were handled in 
equity in pre-1791 England, but the only cases cited are those involving disputes not readily 
remediable at law. See Blad v. Bahfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 922 (Ch. 1674) (within equitable juris-
diction as admiralty case); Townely v. Clench, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603) (equitable process 
was needed to secure documents and testimony). 
American juries early on had the right to disregard the common law in rendering their 
decisions. See, e.g., Witter v. Brewster, Kirby 422, 423 (Conn. 1788) (civil trespass); JAMES 
ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (17 
How. St. Tr. 675 (1735)) 68-69, 72-74 (1735) (2d ed. Katz, 1972) (criminal); Preface, 1 D. 
Chip. (Vt. 1824) (civil and criminal matters in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island 
and Vermont colonial juries). The Supreme Court however opposes this view, providing that 
the jury must follow the law as instructed by the judge at least in criminal matters. E.g., Berra 
v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134-35 (1956); Sparf & Hanson· v. United States, 156 U.S. 52, 
101-03 (1895). See generally Leary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System, 54 
TEx. L. REv. 488 (1976) (providing modern rationale against jury nullification in criminal 
cases). Federal courts apply the rule in civil cases also. See, e.g., Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 
641, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1950) (reversing prior decision which left question of law to jury), cert. 
denied, 340U.S. 954 (1951); Union Bag &Paper Corp. v. Mitchell, 177 F.2d 909,911 (5th Cir. 
1949) (same); Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F.2d 976, 978 (2d Cir. 1947) (same); Sprinkle v. 
Davis, 104 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1939) (same); see also Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 
F.2d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir.) (explaining arguments for and against jury nullification), cert. denied, 
335 u.s. 816 (1948). 
Prior to the merger of courts of law and equity, the right to a jury trial caused little 
problem since the matter depended on the court in which the plaintiff filed the action. LARRY 
TEPLEY & RALPH WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 609 (1991). However, along with the 
merger, problems would arise for mixed actions and actions conditioned on a result from the 
other type of action. I d. When the federal courts began this merger in 1915, see Judiciary Act 
of 1915, Pub. L. No. 63-278, 38 Stat. 956 (adding§ 274(c) to Judiciary Act of 1911 to permit 
equitable defenses to be interposed in actions at law), their goal was to prevent any expansion 
of jury trial. See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922) (requiring 
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trials to be more likely.97 To avoid the prospect of a jury trial, plan ad-
ministrators, in tum, remove the lawsuit as a federal cause of action to 
federal court98 and then move to strike the jury request of the partici-
judge to try equitable defense). The adoption of the Federal Rules of Procedure in 1938 com-
pleted the merger with the goal that the rules not expand the right to jury trial. Fleming J. 
James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022, 1025-26 
(1936). See infra note 97 for the state reaction to these three matters. 
97. Although generally the state judicial systems follow the federal lead concerning jury 
restriction, states have not followed the complexity exception and a few states have expanded 
the jury role by permitting jury nullification in criminal cases, namely, Indiana and Maryland, 
and by permitting jury trials in equity cases, namely, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. State courts that have faced the complexity exception 
to the right to a jury trial have denied it. E.g., Farmer v. Loofbourrow, 267 P.2d 113, 115 
(Idaho 1954); Cloonan v. Goodrich, 167 P.2d 303, 314 (Kan. 1946); Estey v. Holdren, 267 P. 
1098, 1099 (Kan. 1928); Nordeen v. Buck, 82 N.W. 644, 644 (Minn. 1900); M.J. Murphy & 
Sons v. Peters, 62 A.2d 718, 719 (N.H. 1948); Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 
127 A. 708, 710 (N.H. 1924); Daley v. Kennett, 78 A. 123, 124 (N.H. 1910); Watkins v. Siler 
Logging Co., 116 P.2d 315, 322 (Wash. 1941). 
Jury nullification for criminal matters is protected in the constitutions of Indiana and 
Maryland. IND. CoNsr. art. 1, § 19; Mo. CoNsr. Declaration of Rights, § 23. See generally 
Mark Dewolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 582, 590-93 (1939) 
(describing various states permitting jury nullification or forgiveness at various times). 
All states but three have constitutional provisions preserving the right to a jury trial in 
common law actions, with one of the remaining three preserving it through statute. See infra 
note 176. These states are equal to the federal system. Seven states have constitutional or 
statutory provisions extending it to equity actions. See infra note 183. These states exceed the 
federal system. Moreover, states began the merger of law and equity with the code promul-
gated by David Dudley Field, first adopted in New York in 1848, see Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 
379, § 208, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 536 ("[I]n an action for the recovery of money only, or of 
specific real or personal property, there shall be an issue of fact, it must be tried by a jury."), 
and widely adopted shortly thereafter elsewhere. See, e.g., Charles Cook, THE AMERICAN 
CODIFICATION MOVEMENT (1981) (states and territories adopting the Field Procedural Code 
before 1865 were Missouri, California, Kentucky, Iowa, Minnesota, Washington, Nebraska, 
Wisconsin, Kansas, Georgia, Nevada, Dakota Territory, Idaho, Arizona and Montana); Flem-
ing J. James, Right to Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 665, 669-85 (1963). The pur-
pose of the Field Procedural Code was to increase the number of actions subject to a jury trial, 
FIRST REPORT OF THE NEW YORK COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 185 
(1848) ("We propose an extension of the right of trial by jury to many cases, not within the 
constitutional provision."), but the courts in the states adopting the Field Procedural Code 
limited the right to a jury trial to the state's constitutional provision preserving the jury trial in 
common law actions. James, supra, at 667 n.65. 
98. Under the removal statute, plan administrators always have one ground for removal of 
an ERISA case filed in state court to federal court, namely a plaintiff's exclusive federal cause 
of action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 (1989). An ERISA action arises exclusively under federal 
law. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 67 (1987) (benefits-due law-
suit); Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990) (denial of 
benefits due); Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762 (5th Cir. 1989) (benefits-
due lawsuit); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1989) (retaliatory dis-
charge in violation of ERISA§ 510); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 
1989) (benefits-due lawsuit); see, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) 
(employer injunction to enforce no-strike clause in collective bargaining agreement under 
LMRA § 301); Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1989) (dis-
380 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:361 
pant-beneficiary. 99 
The main reason large entities fear juries is the possibility for extra-
contractual and punitive damages, which involve prejudicial issues. 100 
However, extra-contractual101 and punitive102 damages are not recover-
able in an ERISA action. Because these prejudicial damages are outside 
the scope of the ERISA case, the jury should function well. 103 More-
criminatory termination violating collective bargaining agreement under LMRA § 301}; 
Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 772 F.2d 342, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986); Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F.2d 272, 275-78 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(same). 
With respect to the federal cause of action, a state cause of action is preempted by ERISA. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); see, 
e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-46 (1987) (bad faith insurance claims 
processing under long-term disability plan). Under the Avco doctrine, the plan administrator 
may raise the federal cause of action for removal against a state cause of action by merely 
alleging ERISA preemption in his answer. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-67; 
see Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 560 n.2 (LMRA preemption alleged in answer to part of complaint 
for purposes of well-pleaded complaint doctrine for determining removal for federal cause of 
action). The right to a jury trial in removal cases is determined under federal law. Phillips v. 
Moore, 100 U.S. 208, 213 (1879). 
99. See, e.g., Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(participant-beneficiary sought remand to state court to have jury trial); Farlow v. Union 
Cent. Life Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 791, 792 (11th Cir. 1989) (same). 
100. See GUINTHER, supra note 92, at 179 (size of jury verdicts prompted by severity of 
plantiff's injury or outrage at defendant's conduct). In cases involving extra-contractual dam-
ages, such as pain and suffering and punitive damages, studies reveal that jurors are more 
likely to accept plaintiff's claims for damages or add to pain and suffering. Jd. at 97-98. 
101. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Johnson 
v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1988) (infliction of 
emotional distress); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 825 (1st Cir.) 
(same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(same); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (same), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986). See generally Diane M. Sumoski, Note, Participant and 
Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages After Massachu-
setts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1014 (1986) (advocating that 
courts should permit extra-contractual damages). 
102. See, e.g., Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 635 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989); Johnson, 857 F.2d 
at 518; Drinkwater, 846 F.2d at 825; Sage v. Automation Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 
885, 888 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1988); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 838 F.2d 1173, 1174 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 1987); Klein-
hans v. Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug 
Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1464-
65 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long-
Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1986); Powell, 780 F.2d at 424; 
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 653 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 
1084 (1981); see also Deborah A. Geier, Comment, ERISA: Punitive Damages/or Breach in 
Favor of Fiduciary Duty, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 743 (1985) (arguing in favor of recovery of 
punitive damages); Sumoski, Note, supra note 101 (arguing against recovery of punitive 
damages). 
103. See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS: VIEWS FROM THE 
BENCH AND BAR 26 (1981) (even in complicated cases "the jury had made the correct decision 
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over, modem courts have numerous techniques for controlling juries, 
such as motions to dismiss, 104 motions for judgments on the pleadings, 105 
motions for summary judgment, 106 exclusion of evidence, 107 directed ver-
dicts, 108 jury instructions, 109 special verdicts, 110 motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict111 and motions for new trial. 112 Litigants 
and courts should thus encounter few problems handling the benefits-due 
lawsuit by jury trial. 
III. COURT DECISIONS 
Several appellate courts have considered whether a litigant may re-
quire a jury trial for ERISA nongovernmental, civil lawsuits. Whether a 
remedy pursuant to a congressional enactment requires a jury trial ordi-
narily depends on whether the litigant files the lawsuit in federal or state 
court. 
A. Jury Determination Principles 
Federal law determines the right to a jury trial in federal court, even 
when the cause of action arises under state law.113 A federal law deter-
mination involves two considerations. First, did Congress intend, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that the remedy require a jury trial?114 If not, 
does the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution require a 
jury trial?115 
The United States Supreme Court has developed a method for deter-
.•. [and] had no difficulty applying the legal standards to the facts"); GUINTHER, supra note 
92, at 101-02 (studies show that juries do their job well in civil cases). 
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). 
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
107. FED. R. EVID. 104. 
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). 
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 51. 
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a). 
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). See generally TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 96, at 607. 
113. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (right to jury trial in federal courts deter-
mined under federal law in diversity actions); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 
525, 537-40 (1958) (jury trial permitted where state law denies jury trial but federal courts 
permit jury trial); Herron v. Southern Pac. R.R., 283 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1931) (federal courts not 
bound by state law requiring jury trial). See generally 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2303 (1971) (noting it is clear that federal 
law deternrines right to jury trial in federal court but acknowledging substantial authority to 
contrary). 
114. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1974); accord Curtis v. Loether, 415 
U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (court will construe statute to avoid constitutional issue). 
115. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195. 
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mining whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial. 116 Con-
gressionally created causes of action117 that are analogous to "suits at 
common law" prior to adoption of the Seventh Amendment in 1791 re-
quire a jury trial. 118 Actions that are analogous to suits tried in equity or 
admiralty prior to 1791 do not require a jury trial. 119 To make this deter-
mination the Court looks to both the nature of the action and the remedy 
sought. First the Court makes a comparison of actions. 120 Second the 
Court examines the remedy sought. 121 
In contrast, state law determines the right to a jury trial in state 
court even when the cause of action arises under federal law. 122 An ex-
ception is if the right to a jury trial is a substantial part of the substantive 
rights accorded by federal statute. 123 Thus, the state law determination 
involving a federal cause of action, such as a benefits-due lawsuit, in-
volves three considerations. The first consideration is the same as under 
federal law: did Congress intend the cause of action to have a right to 
jury trial?124 Second and third, does a state constitution or a state statute 
require a jury trial?125 
In applying the principles for determining the right to a jury trial, 
courts use the same two approaches used by the pre-ERISA courts. The 
federal courts analogize the employee benefit program to multi-employer 
116. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1349 
(1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-19 (1987). 
117. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193-94. 
118. Id. 
119. ld. at 193-95; Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830). 
120. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1348; accord Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 371-79 
(1974) (examining actions); Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962) (examining 
legal issues). 
121. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1345; accord Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194-98; Ross v. Bernhard, 396 
u.s. 531, 542 (1970). 
122. See, e.g., Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 189-90 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
Herron v. Southern Pac. R.R., 283 U.S. 91, 93 (1931); Southern Ry. v. Durham, 266 U.S. 178, 
179 (1924); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1919); Minneapolis & St. 
L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 221 (1916) (less than unanimous under Federal Employer's 
Liability Act of 1908, ch. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 
(1988)). 
123. E.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (state of Ohio cannot deny 
jury trial in FELA action); Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) (same, 
Vermont). 
124. See, e.g., Brown, 321 U.S. at 189-91. 
125. The Seventh Amendment does not apply to state courts. See Fay v. New York, 332 
U.S. 261, 288 (1947); see also Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 232 (1923) 
(holding petitioner's claim of entitlement to have cause heard before full court erroneous be-
cause it was matter of Missouri law); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207-08 
(1917) (holding denial of trial by jury not inconsistent with due process). 
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plans. 126 In certain instances pre-ERISA law applied trust law to multi-
employer plans, since LMRA specifically requires them to be in trust 
form. 127 Thus, federal courts conclude that employee benefit programs 
are trust-like in nature and consequently the ERISA actions are equitable 
actions, which generally do not require a jury trial. 128 In contrast, state 
courts continue to use their pre-ERISA law that applied contract law.129 
State courts therefore conclude that employee benefit programs are con-
tractual in nature and consequently the ERISA actions generally are ac-
tions at law, which require a jury trial. 
B. Federal Decisions 
Most federal courts deny a jury trial for benefits-due lawsuits under 
ERISA. Their decisions derive solely from Wardle v. Central States, 
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund. 130 This is a poorly reasoned 
opinion. In Wardle the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that 
ERISA does not contain an express provision that grants a right to a jury 
trial and rejected two arguments that ERISA impliedly granted such a 
right,131 
1. The fallacious federal argument against jury trial 
The court in Wardle relied on a statutory implication argument in-
volving an invalid legal proposition. Wardle asserted that the statutory 
scheme mandates only legal, not factual issues. 132 A benefits-due lawsuit 
can only arise to review a plan administrator's discretionary action, 133 
which, reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, is a legal 
question for the judge, not a factual question for the jury.134 This is not 
126. See, e.g., Flint, supra note 25, at 166 & n.155 (explaining that in each circuit first 
ERISA cases for review of fiduciary actions involved multi-employer plans so these courts 
adopted LMRA legal precedence for ERISA plans). 
127. See supra note 85. 
128. See, e.g., Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 
823-24 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); accord In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 
320-21 (8th Cir. 1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980). 
129. See supra note 84. 
130. 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). Wardle involved a 
plan administrator's denial of an owner-operator's application for retirement benefits under a 
jointly-administered union plan on the ground that the participant had a break-in-service. Id. 
at 823. The participant sued under ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B), and not LMRA, for the amount of 
the benefit, punitive damages and attorney's fees. Id. 
131. Id. at 828-30. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text for the two arguments 
and disparagements. 
132. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 828-29. 
133. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text. 
134. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829-30. 
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the law. 
The review standard mandated by the Supreme Court in dicta in 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch is the abuse of discretion stan-
dard. 135 This standard reduces to the arbitrary and capricious rule only 
for the disinterested, properly motivated plan administrator, which is the 
case only for some multi-employer plans. 136 The correct standard in-
volves fact questions concerning the interest and motives of the plan ad-
ministrator, as well as the possibility of selecting the best decision of 
several possible logical ones. 137 The result-denial of jury trial-also is 
not the correct law for contracts with a discretionary provision, although 
it is for trusts with a discretionary provision. Thus, denial of a jury trial 
may have been correct based on the type of action, but not based on the 
issues involved. 138 
The court in Wardle continued by noting that the Supreme Court 
declared review of a federal administrator's discretionary action incom-
patible with a jury trial. 139 Presumedly, that rule should also apply to 
135. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). 
136. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
Employee-participants have urged the recent recognition by the Supreme Court of this 
expanded abuse of discretion review standard to obtain jury trials in federal court. See supra 
notes 71-79 and accompanying text. However, rather than use the correct jurisprudence to 
disregard their impliedly overruled prior review standard of arbitrary and capricious, these 
federal courts continue to follow the arbitrary and capricious standard and deny jury trials. 
E.g., Blake v. Union Mut. Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990); Wise v. 
Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 751 F. Supp. 90, 92 (W.D.N.C. 1990); Pardini v. Southern 
Nev. Culinary & Bartenders Pension Plan & Trust, 733 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (D. Nev. 1990). 
But see Resnick v. Resnick, 763 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (successful). 
137. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115. 
138. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
139. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 830; e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974) (com· 
menting on earlier decision to that effect for review of proceedings of federal administrative 
body, those of NLRB). 
This is a strange position. First, plan administrators are not disinterested, see supra notes 
20-25 and accompanying text, as are administrative law judges. 
Second, contract actions for money owed under a contract or an interpretation of a con· 
tract are very similar to the benefits-due lawsuit. Courts handle the analogous contractual 
situations under contract law with a jury trial, even though using the arbitrary and capricious 
portion of the abuse of discretion review standard. Courts have even prepared jury instruc· 
tions in contract cases relative to review these discretionary determinations. 
Courts uphold the architect's or engineer's decision under a construction contract unless 
he or she acts fraudulently or makes such a gross mistake as to imply bad faith or fails to 
exercise an honest judgment. See supra note 82. Whether the architect or engineer has failed 
to meet this standard is determined under contract law by a jury trial. E.g., Continental Casu· 
alty Co. v. Wilson-Avery, Inc., 156 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); James I. Barnes 
Constr. Co. v. Washington Township, 184 N.E.2d 763, 764 (Ind. App. 1962); Public Water 
Supply Dist. No. 8 v. Maryland Casualty Co., 478 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Mo. 1972) (jury waived), 
modified on other grounds, 513 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1974); Antrim Lumber Co. v. Bowline, 460 
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private plan administrators. The Supreme Court, however, excludes en-
forcement of statutory rights for a civil action in a district court from this 
rule. 140 Since benefits-due lawsuits brought under ERISA are civil ac-
tions to enforce a statutory right, they are thus not incompatible with 
trial by jury. 141 
As to constitutional considerations, the court in Wardle asserted 
P.2d 914, 919 (Okla. 1969); Travis-Williamson County Water Control & Improvement Dist. 
No. 1 v. Page, 358 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 367 S. W.2d 307 (Tex. 1963). Thus, courts instruct juries: 
[T]he court further instructs the jury that, if they believe from the evidence [that 
estimates were fixed as provided in the contract] said estimates must be considered by 
the jury as the correct prices, unless the jury further believes from the evidence that, 
in approving said estimates and in making his decision in reference thereto, and in 
giving the certificate approving the same, the said engineer was guilty of intentional 
fraud, or of such gross mistake as to necessarily imply bad faith on his part. 
2 HENRY RANDALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL CASES § 1317 (1922) (citing Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Mills, 22 S.E. 556 (Va. 1895) 
(second part of abuse of discretion review standard)). 
Courts uphold the buyer's satisfaction decision under a sales contract unless he or she acts 
in bad faith or fails to exercise an honest judgment. See supra note 83. Sellers bring the action 
against the allegedly dissatisfied buyer as a breach of contract claim and so try them before a 
jury. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. Design & Lithography Center, Inc., 614 P.2d 414, 415 
(Idaho 1980) (jury waived); Frankfort Distilleries, Inc. v. Burns Bottling Mach. Works, 197 
A. 599, 601 (Md. 1938); Alper Blouse Co. v. E.E. Conner & Co., 127 N.E.2d 813, 815, reh'g 
denied, 130 N.E.2d 598 (N.Y. 1955); Fulcher v. Nelson, 159 S.E.2d 519, 522-23 (N.C. 1968); 
see also Fidelity Fuel Co. v. Martin Howe Coal Co., 15 F.2d 470, 470 (7th Cir. 1926) (triable 
before jury). Thus, courts instruct juries: 
The jury [is] instructed ... that, under the above condition of the contract, if [the 
jury] believe[s] from the evidence that defendant refused to accept the said machines 
on the ground that it was dissatisfied with them, and that, in so acting, the defendant 
exercised good faith and was honestly dissatisfied, then you should find for defend-
ant, although you may believe that the defendant did not have reasonable grounds 
for such dissatisfaction. 
5 RANDALL, supra,§ 4657(2) (citing Inman Mfg. Co. v. American Cereal Co., 100 N.W. 860 
(Iowa 1904) (both parts of abuse of discretion standard)). 
Similarly, courts have fashioned jury instructions for the review of plan administrator's 
decisions under a pension plan. See, e.g., Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1005 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (jury made arbitrary and capricious finding for long-term disability plan under 
ERISA); Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 221 (4th Cir. 1980) (jury made 
arbitrary and capricious finding for disability plan under LMRA); see also Sommers Drug 
Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 350-53 (5th Cir; 1989) 
(formulating fiduciary responsibility jury instructions). 
Jurors ordinarily have difficulty understanding jury instructions when couched in legal 
language; however, when instructions are written using simple language, juror comprehension 
rises dramatically. Amiram Elkwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, in SAUL KAssiN & 
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND COURTROOM PROCEDURE 
280-97 (1984) (comprehension for mock juries in civil trials increased from 40% to 78%). 
140. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974). 
141. E.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988). 
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that trust law governs pension plans. 142 Trust law provides exclusively 
for an equitable remedy with one exception. 143 A legal remedy exists for 
the beneficiary only for monies due unconditionally and immediately, 144 
which, according to Wardle, is not the case for a pension payable in the 
future over years. 145 A jury trial is available only in this situation. Ben-
efits-due lawsuits, therefore, even when involving questions of fact, are 
equitable and hence do not require a jury trial. 146 
The court provided some erroneous propositions to support this 
conclusion. It claimed that state courts had traditionally dealt with ben-
efits-due lawsuits under the law of trusts, but cited no cases previously 
decided under state law.147 The reason is clear. Investigation of pre-
ERISA state cases reveals that most courts viewed benefits-due lawsuits 
as contractual, 148 and hence most state courts did not use trust law for 
benefits-due cases. The court in Wardle further claimed that federal 
courts followed the state courts in treating benefits-due cases under trust 
law when entertaining them under diversity jurisdiction. 149 In support, 
the court cited only LMRA cases, 150 which courts handle as a federal 
cause of action, not a state cause of action with diversity. 151 Again the 
reason is clear. Investigation of diversity actions indicates that they fol-
lowed state courts in treating benefits-due lawsuits as contractua1. 152 Ac-
142. Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). 
143. See infra note 144. 
144. 1 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 197 (1959) ("Except as stated in§ 198, the 
remedies of the beneficiary against the trustee are exclusively equitable."); id. § 198 ("If the 
trustee is under a duty to pay money immediately and unconditionally to the beneficiary, the 
beneficiary can maintain an action at law against the trustee to enforce payment."). This legal 
trust action derived from the common law writs of debt and general assumpsit. Jefferson Nat'l 
Bank v. Central Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983); Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l 
Bank, 297 F. Supp. 485, 489 (D. Minn. 1969). 
145. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829. 
146. Id. at 828-30. 
147. Id. at 829. 
148. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989); see infra notes 205-08 
and accompanying text. 
149. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829. 
150. Id.; see Genesta v. San Diego County Laborers' Pension Plan, 28 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 1001, 1002 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (disability benefits from jointly-administered union 
plan under LMRA; arbitrary and capricious is question oflaw); Porter v. Central States, S.E. 
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1504, 1505 (N.D. Iowa 1978) 
(pension from jointly-administered union plan under LMRA; follows Restatement trust rule); 
Davis v. Huge, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2234, 2235-36 (E.D. Ky. 1975) (same); Sichko v. Lewis, 
191 F. Supp. 68, 69 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (same). 
151. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text. 
152. See Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 652 F.2d 643, 650 (6th Cir. 1981) (pre-ERISA 
pension plan is contract so remand for jury trial on ambiguous language), cert. denied, 484 
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cording to the court in Wardle, ERISA merely provides a federal forum 
for these trust lawsuits. 153 The court presumed that Congress intended 
to preserve this state law.154 If this presumption is true, the result should 
be opposite. Thus, the court in Wardle not only failed to make an ade-
quate case for the nonjury trial, but used dishonorable methods to thwart 
jury trial. 
2. Other federal decisions 
Nevertheless most circuit courts, lemming-like, have followed the 
Wardle decision in various forms rather than recognize its fallacious rea-
soning, a reasonable basis for disregarding it as precedent. 155 The 
Fourth156 and Eighth157 Circuits have mistakenly asserted that the ab-
U.S. 820 (1987); Wyper v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 57, 63 {2d Cir. 1976) 
(tried to jury following Connecticut's contractual approach for pension claim); Golden v. Ken-
tile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 846-47 {5th Cir. 1975) (nonjury trial following New York's 
contractual approach for pension claim); Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 60-61 
(2d Cir. 1975) (same for incentive compensation plan); Matthews v. Swift & Co., 465 F.2d 814, 
816-18 (5th Cir. 1972) (following New York's contractual approach for disability pension); 
Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1971) (following Virginia's con-
tractual approach for pension claim). 
153. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829. 
154. Id. 
155. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON 86-87 {1960) 
(explaining disregard of precedent due to faulty foundation, implied overruling or misapplica-
tion of legal principles). 
156. See, e.g., Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1985). In Berry 
an employee sued to challenge a plan administrator's decision to terminate long-term disability 
benefits, presumedly under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). I d. The trial court had permitted a jury 
trial and the jury made the "arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or made in bad faith" finding. 
I d. at 1006. The Berry court concluded, however, that "arbitrary and capricious" is too diffi-
cult a concept for a court to communicate to jurors and so a private administrative scheme, 
such as that mandated by ERISA is "incompatible with a jury trial scheme." Id. at 1007; 
accord Dameron v. Sinai Hosp., 815 F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1987). However, state courts have 
no such problem. See supra note 139 for (1) courts addressing contract provisions permitting 
discretion which let jurors decide the arbitrary and capricious issue and (2) jury instructions 
on "arbitrary and capricious." 
District courts in the Fourth Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Ques-
inberry v. Individual Banking Group Accident Ins. Plan, 737 F. Supp. 38, 40 (W.D. Va. 1990) 
(estate sued insurance company as plan administrator for accidental death benefit); Trogner v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 503, 511 (D. Md. 1986) (participant sued for denied 
disability benefit); see also Dameron v. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1404, 1415-16 (D. Md. 
1984) (ERISA actions for benefits due are equitable so that doctrine oflaches applies), aff'd, 
815 F.2d 975 {4th Cir. 1989); Kalata v. United Mine Workers, 533 F. Supp. 313, 319-20 (S.D. 
W.Va.) (arbitrary and capricious review of trustee's plan interpretation reducing benefits is for 
court, not jury), a.ff'd, 696 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1982). 
157. In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir. 1982). In Vorpahl present and future 
employees sued for future and current benefits under a retirement plan under ERISA 
§ 502(a)(l){B). Id. at 319. The court concluded that such lawsuits do not involve any factual 
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sence of factual issues in benefits-due lawsuits does not require a jury. 
The Third, 158 Sixth159 and Eleventh160 Circuits have examined the rem-
issues so denial of a jury request was proper. Id. at 321. However, state courts do not agree. 
See infra notes 178-81, 184-89 for courts submitting the lawsuit to jury determination. 
District courts in the Eighth Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., 
Bohlmann v. Logos Sch., 669 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (employee sued plan adminis-
trator for medical benefits); Hollenbeck v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421, 431 (E.D. 
Mo.) (widow sued employer for benefit due), aff'd, 780 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1985); Hechenberger 
v. Western Elec. Co., 570 F. Supp. 820, 822 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (employee sued trustee for denial 
of benefits), aff'd, 742 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985). 
158. Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
1058 (1986). In Turner retired employees of one plan in a merged entity sued for increased 
pensions from a second plan under ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B). Id. at 44, 46. The court noted that 
most benefits-due lawsuits involved a nonfactual abuse of discretion standard incompatible 
with a jury trial. Id. at 46. Under the remedy test, however, these lawsuits seek an equitable 
remedy and hence require no jury. Id. at 47; accord Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 
649-50 (3d Cir.) (former employee sued for medical insurance benefit; suit involved appeal 
power, seeking equitable remedy), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 47 (1990); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 
F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) (former employees sued for severance pay; enforced by in per-
sonam or contempt so seeking equitable remedy). Normally, seeking money due under a con-
tract is a legal remedy. See supra note 88. 
District courts in the Third Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Haelfele 
v. Hercules Inc., 703 F. Supp. 326, 331 (D. Del. 1989) (former employee challenged denial of 
early retirement); Young v. AT&T Transition Protection Payment Plan, 10 Employee Benefits 
Cas. (BNA) 1920 (D.N.J. 1989) (former employee sued for severance benefits for reorganiza-
tion termination); Gilliken v. Hughes, 609 F. Supp. 178, 181 (D. Del. 1985) (beneficiary sued 
plan administrator for benefits). Some district courts have described the rule for denying jury 
trial as a per se rule: if the case involves an ERISA cause of action, there is no right to a jury 
trial. See Foulke v. Bethlehem 1980 Salaried Pension Plan, 565 F. Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Pa. 
1983) (participant sued for lump sum from pension plan; follows per se rule). 
159. Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988). 
In Daniel a former employee challenged the denial of early retirement benefits, presumedly 
under ERISA§ 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 265. The court noted that for recovery of benefits there is 
no right to a jury, citing a prior case using the equitable remedy test for another type of ERISA 
lawsuit. Id. at 268 (citing Crews v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 
332, 338 (6th Cir. 1986) (employer sought contribution refund under ERISA § 502(a)(3))); 
accord Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 1990) (former employee 
sued for special early retirement benefits; no right to jury trial even if contract issues involved). 
District courts in the Sixth Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Cowden 
v. Montgomery County Soc'y for Cancer Control, 591 F. Supp. 740, 747 (S.D. Ohio 1984) 
(employee sued plan administrator for benefits); Diano v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas 
Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 551 F. Supp. 861, 862-63 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (owner-employee 
sued for benefits due under jointly-administered union pension plan under ERISA, not 
LMRA; only equitable remedy available to beneficiaries of trust fund). 
160. Blake v. Union Mutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990). In 
Blake an employee sued to recover additional benefits under a group health policy under 
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). ld. at 1526. Since this action involved the ordering of continuing 
benefits, it was an equitable action and hence no jury was required. I d.; accord Chilton v. 
Savannah Foods & Indus., 814 F.2d 620, 623-24 (11th Cir. 1987) (former employee sued for 
retirement benefit; no jury required); Howard v. Parisian, Inc. 807 F.2d 1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 
1987) (former employee sued for additional health care under welfare plan; no jury required). 
District courts in the Eleventh Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Lips-
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edy sought, erroneously deemed it equitable, and denied a jury trial. The 
Fifth, 161 Eleventh162 and Ninth163 Circuits have followed the trust law 
comb v. Transac, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (employee sued for long-term 
disability benefits); Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Group Health Plan, 714 F. Supp. 1168, 
1169 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (employee sued for health benefits; but used advisory jury), rev'd on 
other grounds, 908 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1990); Tucker v. Employers Life Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 
1073, 1077 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (participant sued under employer's plan that had been switched 
from group insurance to individual insurance); Whitt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 676 F. 
Supp. 1119, 1134 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (participants sued for benefits due under private company 
plans); Chambers v. Kaleidoscope, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust, 650 F. Supp. 359, 378 
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (participant in private company plan sued for breach of fiduciary duty and 
failure to distribute benefits; jury trial unavailable for punitive damages); Zittrouer v. Uarco 
Inc. Group Benefit Plan, 582 F. Supp. 1471, 1478 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (widow sued plan adminis-
trator for medical benefits); Chastain v. Delta Air Lines, 496 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D. Ga. 
1980) (widow sued plan administrator for disability and survivor benefit); see also Jordan v. 
Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827-28 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (dicta) (widow sued insur-
ance company for non-payment of accidental death benefits); McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield, 691 F. Supp. 1314, 1315 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (same), aff'd, 874 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(deceased's representative sued insurance company to recover deceased's medical expenses); 
Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 681 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (same), rev'd on 
other grounds, 868 F.2d 430 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989) (beneficiaries sued to 
recover money allegedly due them under employee benefit plans). 
The court in Whitt had earlier concluded that a suit for benefits was legal in nature and so 
had decided to allow jury trial, but reconsidered after finding Chilton. Whitt, 676 F. Supp. at 
1132. A significant number of opinions from district courts in the Eleventh Circuit assert that 
jury denial is error. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345, 348 (N.D. 
Ala. 1990); Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 F. Supp. 1542, 1545-46 (N.D. Ala. 
1990); Porter v. Mutual Serv. Life Ins. Co., No. CV-PT-700-S, 1990 WL 174716, at *3 (N.D. 
Ala. June 26, 1990); Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342, 343 (S.D. Fla. 
1990). 
161. Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980). In Calamia an employee sued 
for a declaration that a disability benefit was higher than that paid from a jointly-administered 
union pension plan under ERISA§ 502(a)(l)(B), without suing under LMRA. Id. at 1236. 
The court stated that it concurred with Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension 
Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). Calamia, 632 
F.2d at 1237. 
District courts in the Fifth Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Fonner 
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 747 F. Supp. 340, 341-42 (M.D. La. 1990) (retiree sued for past-due 
retirement benefits); Stage v. Life Ins. Co. ofN. Am., Civ. A. 89-1251, 1990 WL 32941, at *1, 
*3 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 1990) (employee sued under accidental death and disability plan); Moffit 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1391, 1395 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (employee 
challenged termination of health benefits upon severance); Juckett v. Beecham Home Improve-
ment Prods., Inc., 684 F. Supp. 448, 452 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (beneficiary sued for benefits due); 
Sublett v. Premier Bancorp Self-Funded Medical Plan, 683 F. Supp. 153, 155 (M.D. La. 1988) 
(employee sued plan administrator for medical benefits). 
162. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829; accord Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton 
Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1986) (employee sued for disability benefits due; 
no jury required), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987); Jefferson Nat'1 Bank v. Central Nat'l 
Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983) (former employee sued for lump-sum vested benefit; 
lawsuit fits trust law legal remedy so jury trial required). 
District courts in the Seventh Circuit generally have concluded similarly. See, e.g., Al-
lison v. Duggan, 737 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (retiree sued for suspended retire-
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rule, permitting a jury trial only for unconditional and immediately paya-
ble benefits. The First/64 Second165 and Tenth166 Circuits have yet to 
ment benefits); Grodsky v. Benefit Trust Life Ins., No. 89 C 463, 1990 WL 36261, at *2 (N.D. 
Dl. Mar. 5, 1990) (widow sued for health and life insurance benefits); Ovitz v. Jefferies & Co., 
553 F. Supp. 300, 301 (N.D. Dl. 1982) (employee sued plan administrator for additional 
amounts from profit-sharing plan; unconditional and immediate so have jury trial under trust 
law's legal remedy); see also Senn v. AMCA Int'l, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10,637 (B.D. Wis. 
Sept. 10, 1990) (retirees sued for health and life insurance benefits; but used advisory jury). 
163. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Digregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 
1987). In Transamerica an insurer sued derivatively on behalf of a beneficiary for a declara-
tion that its policy had no double indemnity with respect to that beneficiary, presumedly under 
ERISA§ 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 1251-52. Since this action requested a ruling on whether a bene-
fit was unconditionally due and immediately payable, it fit the trust law's legal remedy and a 
jury was required. Id. at 1252; accord Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 
1987) (former employees sued employer for denied severance pay; no jury required); Blau v. 
Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir.) (former employees sued employer for benefits 
due nnder welfare plan; no jury required), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865 (1985). 
District "courts in the Ninth Circuit generally have concluded similarly. See, e.g., Pardini 
v. Southern Nev. Culinary and Bartenders Pension Plan & Trust, 733 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (D. 
Nev. 1990) (beneficiary sued for benefits); see also Weinfurther v. Source Servs. Corp. Employ-
ees Profit-Sharing Plan & Trust, 759 F. Supp. 599, 601 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (dicta) (former em-
ployees sued to recover benefits accrued during employment). 
164. In the First Circuit only district courts have considered the matter. Several of these 
courts have followed the trust law legal remedy rule to deny jury trials. See, e.g., Fuller v. 
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 462, 464 (D. Mass. 1990) (employee challenging 
denial of medical benefits not entitled to jury trial); Turner v. Leesona Corp., 673 F. Supp. 67, 
70 (D.R.I. 1987) (employee suing for benefit from former employer's group long-term disabil-
ity policy; no jury required); Wilson v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp. 52, 54 (D. 
Me. 1987) (husband sued for benefits due from deceased wife's employer's life insurance plan; 
no jury required); Strout v. GTE Prod. Corp., 618 F. Supp. 444, 445 (D. Me. 1985) (employee 
suing for benefits from former employer's pension and welfare plans; ERISA suit essentially 
based on law of trusts, not contracts; no jury required). 
Some courts have even suggested that if a plan administrator denies eligibility, that alone 
defeats a jury trial since the unconditional provision is not satisfied. Turner, 673 F. Supp. at 70 
(trust law's legal remedy inapplicable when contested eligibility involved); Wilson, 610 F. 
Supp. at 54 (trust law's legal remedy inapplicable when entitlement denial involved). 
Presumedly the denial is in good faith, not bad faith. The right to a jury trial should depend 
on the participant-beneficiary's cause of action, not prior action of the plan administrator. See 
supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text. 
These courts provide the reason that the case involves interpretation of the trust docu-
ment. Turner, 673 F. Supp. at 70. Traditionally, this was done under the same principles as 
those in contract law. See supra note 87. Contract interpretation is a question of law for the 
judge unless there is an ambiguity, in which case a jury determines the interpretation. See 
supra note 86. Therefore, the judge must find that the plan administrator made a possible 
error, there being more than one logical result, then submit the issue to a jury on the abuse of 
discretion standard. 
165. An examination of Second Circuit suits involving other types of ERISA lawsuits indi-
cates that the Second Circuit follows the remedy test. Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 {2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984). In Katsaros an employee sued under ERISA 
§ 502{a)(3) for equitable relief of trustee removal and restitution to plan for breaches of fiduci-
ary duty in making loans from the plan. Id. The court distinguished that case from the 
mooted ruling in Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem., 622 
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address the problem. 
Not all the federal courts have reached the same conclusion as the 
court in Wardle. The first decision under ERISA to address whether 
benefits-due actions require a jury trial, Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters 
Joint Council No. 43,167 determined that Congress implicitly intended 
courts to try some ERISA actions by jury. 168 The court in Stamps ex-
amined two indications of this intent. First, the legislative scheme sets 
forth two remedies for the participant-one for an injunction and the 
other for benefits. 169 The injunctive relief clearly was intended to be eq-
uitable with no right to a jury trial, so in order for the other not to be 
surplusage, it must relate to legal remedies that require a jury trial. 170 
F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980). Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 278-79. In Katsaros the remedy sought deter-
mined the outcome. In Pollock the court affirmed the lower court's mandate of a jury trial for 
determination of a benefit amount. However, as the court in Katsaros pointed out, the trial 
never occurred because the trial court on remand decided the equitable question, reformation 
of the plan, to avoid the legal question. Katsaros, 144 F.2d at 278-79. 
Consequently, some district courts in the Second Circuit have found the participant-bene-
ficiary seeking equitable remedies and, as a result, denied a jury. See, e.g., Gardella v. Mutual 
Life Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 627, 629 (D. Conn. 1988) (employee sought benefits due); In re 
Emhart Corp., 706 F. Supp. 153, 155-56 (D. Conn. 1988) (former employees sued to recover 
severance pay; suit for benefits is equitable); Nobile v. Pension Comm. of Pension Plan, 611 F. 
Supp. 725, 727-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (executor sued for death benefit from deceased's em-
ployer's pension plan; trust law's legal remedy inapplicable when trust document interpreta-
tion involved); Ruben v. Decision Concepts, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(employee sued for termination benefit from profit-sharing plan; trust law's legal remedy inap-
plicable when amount of damages is involved). 
A significant number of opinions from the district courts in the Second Circuit assert the 
jury denial is error. See infra note 173. 
166. The Tenth Circuit did note that the other circuits that have considered the issue denied 
the right to a jury trial. Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Bd. of Painters & Allied 
Trades Union, 653 F.2d 424, 426 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1981). 
Some district courts in the Tenth Circuit have found the participant-beneficiary seeking 
equitable remedies and so denied a jury trial. See, e.g., Bass v. Prudential Ins. Co., 751 F. 
Supp. 192, 194 (D. Kan. 1990) (beneficiary sued for benefits); Porterfield v. Deffenbaugh In-
dus., No. Civ. A. 88-2385-S, 1988 WL 143436, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 13, 1988) (employee sued 
for denied medical benefits). 
167. 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (retired employee sued for benefits under LMRA 
and ERISA for benefits due and owing). 
168. Id. at 747. 
169. ERISA provides essentially two participant remedies: (1) the right to recover benefits, 
enforce rights and clarify rights, all under the terms of the plan, Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988); and (2) injunctive and 
other equitable relief, id. § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 
170. The argument is that the benefit claim action provision would be surplusage if it also 
provided only equitable relief. See Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Digregorio, 811 
F.2d 1249, 1251 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (claim for benefits under life insurance contract is legal 
remedy); Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606, 608-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (approving argu-
ment). 
One commentator believes enforcement and clarification of rights are equitable. See 
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The second indication was ERISA's legislative history that required 
courts to follow LMRA procedures, 171 permitting a jury trial. 172 A few 
district courts have followed Stamps' lead. 173 
Note, supra note 6, at 756. Enforcement's characterization, though, depends on the remedy 
sought, see infra notes 289-311 and accompanying text, and a clarification of rights' characteri-
zation also depends on the remedy sought in the absence of the declaratory action, see infra 
note 296 and accompanying text. 
The Wardle court contends that concurrent jurisdiction for benefits-due lawsuits man-
dates the statutory scheme, not the legal-equitable distinction. Wardle v. Central States, S.E. 
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 
(1981). Even if all claim benefit actions were equitable, they would still need a separate section 
since these actions are triable in both state and federal court. See Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, § 502(e), 29 U.S. C. § 1132(e) (1988) (providing concurrent juris-
diction in federal and state court for benefit claim lawsuits). See infra notes 217-32 and 
accompanying text for the response to this disparagement. 
171. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 323, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5107. "All such actions in federal or state courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws 
of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under§ 301 of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act of 1947." Id. 
The court in Wardle contends that this legislative history merely means that the courts 
should fashion a federal common law, not make such actions identical to LMRA actions. 
Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1985) 
(LMRA § 301 means courts are to fashion common law for collective bargaining agreements). 
However, in concluding that the courts under ERISA are to fashion a federal common 
law, the Supreme Court relies on other legislative history. It cites a senator's statement to that 
effect. 120 CoNG. REc. S29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[A) body of Federal sub-
stantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations 
under private welfare and pension plans."); see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 
U.S. 101, 110 (1989); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985); 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983); H.R. 
REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649 
(ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions "codifTy) and make[] applicable to [ERISA) fidu-
ciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."). 
In contrast, the Supreme Court treats the reference to LMRA § 301 as meaning that a 
benefits-due lawsuit be treated as a federal question for preempting state law, see Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1987), or authorizing grafting ofLMRA procedures onto 
benefits-due lawsuits; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987) 
(adopting LMRAAvco rule for benefits-due lawsuits, indicating that quoted legislative history 
cannot be "more specific reference to the Avco rule"); see also supra note 98. 
172. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text. 
173. Almost all of the district courts finding a right to a jury trial are located in two cir-
cuits. 
The Second Circuit cases come primarily from New York, a state that permits jury trials 
in ERISA actions. E.g., Resnick v. Resnick, 763 F. Supp. 760, 765-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (par-
ticipant sued for lump sum from pension plan); Smith v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Civ. 1888, 
1990 WL 209456, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1990) (former employee sued for disability bene-
fits); Abbarno v. Carborundum Co., 682 F. Supp. 179, 181-82 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (participants 
sued to recover severance pay from private company plan; damage action for nonpayment of 
benefits and so legal although involving review under arbitrary and capricious rule); Paladino 
v. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (participant sued for 
benefit denial from union plan without suing under LMRA; involving the arbitrary and capri-
cious rule; permitting jury trial because these actions are legal in nature, arising out of contract 
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The circuit courts have permitted jury trials for benefits-due law-
suits when other matters that require a jury trial have also been in-
volved. 174 With respect to other types of litigation under ERISA, their 
decisions have been mixed. 175 
between union, employers and trustees, with employee as third party beneficiary); Pollock v. 
Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (former employee sued trustee for prohib-
ited transaction by terminated plan, treated as benefits-due lawsuit), aff'd, 622 F.2d 575 (2d 
Cir. 1980); see Reeves v. Continental Equities Corp., 765 F. Supp. 469, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(judge uncertain whether case concerns breach of fiduciary without jury trial or damages for 
nonpayment with jury trial; judge defers to gather evidence for jury determination); Sixty-Five 
Sec. Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 583 F. Supp. 380, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dicta); 
Gehrhardt v. General Motors Corp., 434 F. Supp. 981, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (employee sued 
employer for denied pension benefit; jury trial not questioned), aff'd, 581 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 
1978). See infra note 179 for New York state cases. 
The Eleventh Circuit cases come primarily from Alabama, a state that permits jury trials 
in ERISA actions. E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345, 348 (N.D. Ala. 
1990) (subrogation action for medical benefits); Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 
F. Supp. 1542, 1545-46 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (employee sued for benefits due); Porter v. Mutual 
Serv. Life Ins. Co., No. CV90-PT-700-S, 1990 WL 174716, at *3 (N.D. Ala. June 26, 1990) 
(beneficiary sued for benefits due); Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342, 
343 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See infra note 185 for Alabama state cases. 
Similar isolated opinions have come from the Third Circuit, Puz v. Bessemer Cement Co., 
700 F. Supp. 267, 268 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (retirees sued seeking entitlement to lifetime health 
insurance benefits; major issue contractual involving factual ambiguities in plan provisions), 
the Sixth Circuit, International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
Workers v. Park-Ohio Indus., 661 F. Supp. 1281, 1310 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (employee sued plan 
administrator for breach of fiduciary duties in terminating health benefits treated as benefits-
due lawsuit), aff'd, 876 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit, Boesl v. Suburban Trust 
& Sav. Bank, 642 F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (employee sued plan administrator for 
wrongful denial of medical benefits), and the Tenth Circuit, Lawson v. Lapeka, Inc., 55 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 987 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 1991) (former employee sought additional 
retirement benefits, jury trial not questioned). 
174. E.g., Krause v. Dresser Indus., 910 F.2d 674, 676 (lOth Cir. 1990) (affirming ERISA 
claim for lost benefits for wrongful termination in violation of Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), 
which permits legal or equitable relief, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1988)); Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, 
Inc., 842 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988). 
175. The other ERISA actions primarily deal with fiduciary breaches, injunctions and other 
equitable relief, and contribution refunds. 
In actions under ERISA § 502(a)(2) by participant-beneficiaries and fiduciaries for fiduci-
ary breaches, typically violations of ERISA § 409(a), the federal courts generally deny jury 
trials. E.g., Devine v. Combustion Eng'g, 760 F. Supp. 989, 994 (D. Conn. 1991) (participant 
requested injunction to prevent breach of fiduciary duty in plan amendment); Goodman v. S & 
A Restaurant Corp., 756 F. Supp. 966, 970 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (participant sued for breach of 
fiduciary duty for failure to process application for medical benefits in timely manner); Diduck 
v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, 737 F. Supp. 808, 810-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (employees sued 
employer to make plan whole for breach of fiduciary duty; relief sought is equitable); Motor 
Carriers Labor Advisory Council v. Trucking Management, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 701, 702 (E.D. 
Pa. 1990) (employers sued trustees for breaches of fiduciary duty violating ERISA § 409); 
Baker v. Universal Die Casting, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 416,418 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (former employ-
ees sued employer for wrongful termination of plan); Berlo v. McCoy, 710 F. Supp. 873, 874 
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C. State Decisions 
Because the majority of federal decisions, which exclusively follow a 
(D.N.H. 1989) (participant sued trustees for breach of fiduciary duty in failing to credit inter-
est); Brock v. Group Legal Adm'rs, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Department 
of Labor on behalf of participants sought restitution and injunction for breach of fiduciary 
duty); Browning v. Grote Meat Co., 703 F. Supp. 790, 794-95 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (former em· 
ployee sued plan administrator for violation of ERISA § 409 for failing to provide medical 
insurance following termination); Trustees of Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund 
v. Golden Nuggett, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1538, 1549 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (plan administrator sued 
investment manager for fiduciary violations in permitting plan to sell discounted notes that 
were prepaid in full); Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 694 F. Supp. 624, 627 n.4 (D. Minn. 1988) 
(plan administrators sued investment manager for breach of fiduciary duty); Smith v. ABS 
Indus., 653 F. Supp. 94, 97-99 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (retirees sued employers for breaches of 
fiduciary duties violating ERISA § 409); Bigger v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 652 F. 
Supp. 123, 128 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (participants sued plan administrators for breach of fiduciary 
duty in connection with transfer of assets from first pension plan to second one being spun oil); 
Unitis v. JFC Acquisition Co., 643 F. Supp. 454, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (participants challenged 
employer's decision to amend pension plan and terminate fund to recover excess funding as 
breach of fiduciary duty; equitable); Burud v. Acme Elec. Co., 591 F. Supp. 238, 248 n.9 (D. 
Alaska 1984) (employee sued to undo certain transactions constituting fiduciary breaches); 
Kahnke v. Herter, 579 F. Supp. 1524, 1526-28 (D. Minn. 1984) (participants sued plan admin-
istrators for breaches of fiduciary duty violating ERISA § 409). 
However, some federal courts have permitted jury trials in ERISA actions involving fidu-
ciary breaches. E.g., Sommers Drug Stores Employee Profit-Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 
F.2d 345, 350-53 (5th Cir. 1989) (reviewing fiduciary responsibility jury instructions); Utilcorp 
United Inc. v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 741 F. Supp. 1363, 1366-67 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (employer 
sued investment manager for fiduciary breaches; involving legal issues and thus requiring jury 
trial). 
In actions under ERISA § 502(a)(3), for injunctions and other equitable relief to prevent 
fiduciary breaches or enforce ERISA's statutory provisions, courts deny jury trials due to the 
express reference to equity. E.g., Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 
1990) (in statement in plan sought by participant-beneficiary as well as benefits due); Cox v. 
Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 392-93 (3d Cir. 1988) (remedy for retaliatory discharge 
for exercising ERISA rights under ERISA§ 510, sought by participant-beneficiary as well as 
benefits due), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 47 (1990); Crews v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas 
Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 1986) (employer sought refund of mistaken contri· 
bution under ERISA§ 403(c); restitution is equitable remedy); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 
770 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1985) (dicta), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Katsaros v. Cody, 
744 F.2d 270, 278-79 (2d Cir.) (trustee removal and plan restitution sought by participant· 
beneficiaries), cert. denied sub nom. Cody v. Donovan, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Haberern v. 
Kaupp Vascular Surgeons, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 88-1853, 1989 WL 71474, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 
26, 1989) (employee sued plan administrator for accounting relating to various breaches of 
fiduciary duty); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (former 
employee sued for retaliatory discharge due to exercise of ERISA rights in violation of ERISA 
§ 510; court held equitable action); Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 
1089 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (participant sued for wrongful withholding of termination benefit from 
profit-sharing plan). 
But some federal courts have permitted jury trials in ERISA actions involving the alleg· 
edly equitable relief. E.g., Garcia v. Danbury Hosp. Corp., No. Civ. B-90-232, 1991 WL 
23537, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 1991) (former employee sued for retaliatory discharge); Weber 
v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D. Conn. 1990) (retaliatory discharge under ERISA 
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trust approach to employee benefit programs, have concluded generally 
that ERISA did not grant an implied right to a jury trial, state courts 
focus on their own constitutions and statutes to resolve whether they try 
the benefits-due lawsuit by jury. 
Most state constitutional provisions relating to the right to a jury 
trial in civil actions only preserve it. 176 State courts have held that their 
constitutions only protect the right to a jury trial available under the 
common law and statutes current in the colony, territory or state 
(although a few use English law) at the time of the adoption of the partic-
ular state of its constitution.177 Under a constitutional provision of this 
§ 510 involves fact questions; requiring jury trial); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 
F. Supp. 882, 885-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same). 
The circuit courts also generally deny jury trials for recovery of unpaid contributions 
under ERISA§ 502(a)(3). E.g., Sheet Metal Workers Loca119 v. Keystone Heating & Air 
Conditioning, 934 F.2d 35, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1991) (jury trial was error). 
Some circuit courts have permitted jury trials in ERISA actions involving unpaid contri-
butions. E.g., May v. Interstate Moving & Storage, 739 F.2d 521, 523 (lOth Cir. 1984) (ambi-
guity in collective bargaining agreement permits jury trial). 
176. Thirty-five state constitutions contain language stating that the right to a jury trial 
shall remain "inviolate." ALA. CoNST. art. I, § 11; ARiz. CoNST. art. II, § 23; ARK. CONST. 
art. 2, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 16; CoNN. CONST. art. 1, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 22; GA. 
CONST. art. I, § 1, 1[ XI; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. 
1, § 20 (for civil cases); IOWA CONST. art. I,§ 9; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights,§ 5; KY. CONST. 
Bill of Rights, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; MISS. CoNST. art. 3, § 31; Mo. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 22(a); MoNT. CoNST. art. II, § 26; NEB. CoNST. art. I, § 6; NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 3; N.J. 
CONST. art. I, 1f 9; N.M. CONST. art. II,§ 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I,§ 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 25; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CoNST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. 
CONST. art. I,§ 17; PA. CONST. art. I,§ 6; R.I. CoNST. art. I,§ 15; S.C. CONST. art. I,§ 14; 
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6; TENN. CoNST. art. I, § 6; TEx. CoNST. art. I, § 15; wASH. CoNST. 
art. I, § 21; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
Five state constitutions "preserve" the right. ALASKA CoNST. art. I, § 16 (civil cases); 
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 13; Mo. CoNST. Declaration of Rights art. 23; W. VA. CONST. art. Ill, 
§ 13; see MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14 (shall remain). Four state constitutions provide the right 
except as heretofore otherwise stated. ME. CoNST. art. I, § 20 (civil cases); MAss. CoNST. pt. 
1, art. XV; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 20; see DEL. CoNST. art. I, § 4 (granted as heretofore). 
Two state constitutions hold the right sacred. VT. CoNST. ch. I, art. 12; VA. CONST. art. 
I, § 11 (civil cases). 
Utah's constitutional provision is ambiguous as mentioning only capital cases. UTAH 
CONST. art. I, § 10 (inviolate); see Ronan E. Degnan, Right to Civil Jury Trial in Utah: Consti-
tution and Statute, 8 UTAH L. REv. 97, 101 (1963). On the basis of state constitutional con-
vention history, Utah's highest court has held it covers civil suits. International Harvester 
Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Trailer & Implement Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 419 (Utah 1981). 
Three states have no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases. See Firelock, Inc. v. 
District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989); Duplantis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. 
Ins. Corp., 342 So. 2d 1142, 1143-44 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (jury trial by statute only, LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1731 (West 1990)); Farrell v. Hursh Agency, Inc., 713 P.2d 1174, 1181 
(Wyo. 1986); see also James, supra note 96, at 1022 n.4 (noting, as of 1935, Colorado and 
Louisiana had no constitutional guarantee of jury trial in civil actions). 
177. Eighteen states that have so decided have had only one constitution so there is no 
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type, the existence of a right to a jury trial depends on whether the court 
problem concerning which constitution. Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 580 n.7 
(Alaska 1973) (territorial law as looks to Seventh Amendment, U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII); 
Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 410 P.2d 479, 482 (Ariz. 1966) (1911; territorial law); Harada v. 
Burns, 445 P.2d 376, 380 n.l (Haw. 1968) (territorial law as looks to Seventh Amendment); 
Sheets v. Agro-West, Inc., 664 P.2d 787, 791 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (1889; territorial law); 
State v. Pinkerton, 340 P.2d 393, 395 (Kan. 1959) (1859; territorial law as finds territorial 
statute); North School Congregate Housing v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me. 1989) 
(1820; Massachusetts law); Freeman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 109-10 (Mass. 1980) (1780; 
English and provincial law); Breinhorst v. Beckman, 35 N.W.2d 719,734 (Minn. 1949) (1858; 
territorial law); Hudson v. City of Las Vegas, 409 P.2d 245, 246-47 (Nev. 1965) (1864; territo-
rial law as looks to U.S. Constitution); Bliss v. Greenwood, 315 P.2d 223, 226 (N.M. 1957) 
(1911; territorial law); Smith v. Kunert, 115 N.W. 76, 77 (N.D. 1907) (1889; territorial law); 
Keeter v. State, 198 P. 866, 869 (Okla. 1921) (1907; territorial law); In re Idleman's Commit-
ment, 27 P.2d 305, 310 (Or. 1933) (1859; territorial law as finds territorial statute); Briggs 
Drive, Inc. v. Moorehead, 239 A.2d 186, 187 (R.I. 1968) (1843; state law); Shaw v. Shaw, 133 
N.W. 292, 292-93 (S.D. 1911) (territorial law as looks to Seventh Amendment); Zions First 
Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1990) (1896; territo-
rial law); Firchau v. Gaskill, 558 P.2d 194, 197 (Wash. 1978) (1889; territorial law as finds 
territorial statute); Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 102 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Wis. 1960) (1848; terri-
torial law as looks to Seventh Amendment). 
Of the states with multiple constitutions, thirteen provide for the most recently passed 
constitution, meaning that a statute granting the right to a jury trial then in effect is also 
protected. Ex parte W & H Mach. & Tool Co., 283 So. 2d 173, 175-76 (Ala. 1973) (1901; state 
law); State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281, 292 (Ark. 1870) (naming present constitution; now 1874; 
state law); Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 17 (Conn. 1975) (naming existing of 1965); Doris 
v. McFarland, 156 A. 52, 57 (Conn. 1931) (state law as uses own decision); Cahill v. State, 411 
A.2d 317, 322 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (naming last of 1897 to protect jury trial under 1792 
statute; state law), rev'd on other grounds, 443 A.2d 497 (Del. 1982); State Line Elevator, Inc. 
v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 526 N.E.2d 753, 754 (Ind. 1988) (1852; state law as eschews 
Seventh Amendment); State Conservation Dep't v. Brown, 55 N.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Mich. 
1952) (naming 1908, now 1964; state law as refers to state statutes); Vannoy v. Swift & Co., 
201 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Mo. 1947) (naming 1875, now 1945; state law as looks to pre-constitu· 
tion state cases); State v. Hauser, 288 N.W. 518, 520 (Neb. 1939) (constitution, presumedly 
current one of 1875; state law as refers to state statutes); Stizza v. Essex County Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations Court, 40 A.2d 567, 569 (N.J. 1945) (naming 1844, now 1947; state law); 
Daley v. Kennet, 78 A. 123, 124-25 (N.H. 1910) (naming 1784; state law as looks to this 
jurisdiction); White v. White, 196 S.W. 508, 517 (Tex. 1917) (naming 1876; state law); Demp· 
sey v. Hollis, 75 A.2d 662, 663 (Vt. 1950) (naming 1793; state law); Hickman v. Baltimore & 
O.R.R., 4 S.E. 654, 655-56 (W.Va. 1887) (1880 when that provision of 1872 constitution was 
last amended; state law), overruled on other grounds by Richmond v. Henderson, 37 S.E. 653, 
657 (W. Va. 1900). 
Of those states with multiple constitutions, eleven provide for the first constitution. Peo· 
pie v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-87, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (1951) (1850; 
English law); State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 1976) (1845); Dudley v. Harrison, 
McCready & Co., 173 So. 820, 825 (Fla. 1937) (territorial law as looks to Seventh Amend-
ment); Iowa Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d 724, 726-28 (Iowa 1981) (1846; 
territorial law as looks to Seventh Amendment); People v. Kelly, 179 N.E. 898, 902 (Ill. 1931) 
(1818; territorial law); Johnson v. Holbrook, 302 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Ky. 1957) (1792; territorial 
law as looks to Seventh Amendment); Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance Corp., 215 
A.2d 192, 198-99 (Md. 1965) (1776); Commonwealth v. Warren, 105 A.2d 488,491 (Md. App. 
Ct. 1954) (provincial law); In re C.L.A. & J.A., 685 P.2d 931, 933-34 (Mont. 1984) (1889; 
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views the employee benefit program as a contract, legal in nature, or as a 
trust, equitable in nature. State courts in Nevada,l18 New York, 179 Vir-
ginia180 and Wisconsin181 have used the contractual approach to em-
ployee benefit programs to find the right to a jury trial in a benefits-due 
lawsuit. A court in Florida, using the trust approach, has found no right 
to a jury trial. 182 
In addition to this type of constitutional provision, seven states have 
constitutional or statutory provisions granting jury trials in equity mat-
ters under certain conditions, usually for fact questions. 183 Under provi-
territorial law as uses territorial statute); Mason v. State, 50 N.E. 6, 9 (Ohio 1898) (1802; 
territorial law); Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89, 96 (1862) (1776; English and colonial 
law); Patten v. State, 426 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tenn. 1968) (1796; North Carolina law), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 844 (1970); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 66 S.E.2d 841, 843 (Va. 1951) 
(criminal jury under English and colonial law in 1776 under sinrllar constitutional provision); 
Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 105 S.E. 141, 148 (Va. 1920) (1776). 
Of those states with multiple constitutions, four provide for some intermediate constitu-
tion. Cawthon v. Douglas Co., 286 S.E.2d 30, 32-34 (Ga. 1982) (naming 1798 as first such 
provision; but Georgia constitutions of 1777 and 1789 also had provision; see 2 FRANcis 
THORP, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTlONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND ORGANIC 
LAWS 785,789 (1909) (state law); Moot v. Moot, 108 N.E. 424,425 (N.Y. 1915) (1846; consti-
tution in effect when constitutional provision referring to earlier constitution adopted, thereby 
cutting off effect of Wynehammer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 425-27 (Ct. App. 1856) (specifying 
current constitution); state law)); North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89, 93-95 
(N.C. 1982) (1868 constitution since 1979 constitution merely corrected its outdated language 
and arrangement; state law); Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 244 S.E.2d 315, 316 (S.C. 1978) (1868 
constitution, unwittingly overruling State v. Gibbes, 95 S.E. 346, 347-48 (S.C. 1918) (first 
constitution of 1776 since all since then have such provision; state law)). 
Mississippi's highest court has stated the constitution provides for an unspecified ancient 
time. Walters v. Blackledge, 71 So. 2d 433, 445 (Miss. 1954) (presumedly English). 
178. See Herbst v. Humana Health Ins., 781 P.2d 762, 763 (Nev. 1989) (right to jury trial 
not questioned; medical plan). 
179. Walker v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959-60 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (fol-
lowing Paladino v. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); disabil-
ity plan); Fuller v. INA Life Ins. Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217-18 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (same; 
accidental death plan). 
180. See Nicely v. Bank of Va. Trust Co., 277 S.E.2d 209, 210 (Va. 1981) (jury trial not 
questioned; profit-sharing plan). 
181. Evans v. W.E.A. Ins. Trust, 361 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Wis. 1985) (benefits-due lawsuit is 
one for money damages with right to jury trial; health plan). 
182. Pfeiffer v. Roux Lab., Inc., 547 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (benefits-
due lawsuit is equitable, not contractual, requires no jury; disability plan). 
183. Prior to 1950, of the thirteen states that had experimented with a right to jury trial in 
equity actions, only four have retained it. See M.T. Van Heeke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 
31 N.C. L. REv. 157, 158 (1953). Since 1845, Texas has provided it broadly by constitution. 
TEX. CoNST. art. V, § 10 (all causes in state district courts); State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, 
Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 292-93 (Tex. 1975) (constitutional provision extends jury trial to all 
actions and suits in law or equity). North Carolina since 1873 provides a right to jury trial for 
fact questions in equity by an interpretation of its constitution. See Lee v. Pearce, 68 N.C. 76, 
82 (1873) (interpreting 1868 constitution). Georgia since 1792 and Tennessee since 1846 pro-
vide it by statute for questions of fact. GA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-66 (Harrison 1991); TENN. 
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sions of this type, courts in· Arizona, 184 Alabama, 185 Georgia, 186 North 
Carolina, 187 Tennessee188 and Texas189 have found a right to a jury trial 
in a benefits-due lawsuit. The remaining state permitting jury trials in 
some equity matters, Louisiana, denies a jury trial for benefits-due law-
suits. 190 That state's statute denies a jury trial if it is denied by federal 
law191 and Louisiana courts interpreted the Wardle v. Central States, 
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund 192 decision as invoking that 
CoDE ANN. § 21-1-103 (1980 & Supp. 1990). See generally James A. Gardner, Anachronism 
of Modem Equity-Discretion of the Chancellor in the Use of the Jury, 8 MERCER L. REv. 225 
(1957) (explaining development of equity juries in Georgia); Frank C. Ingraham, Note, Jury 
Trial in Chancery Court in Tennessee, 7 V AND. L. REv. 393 (1954) (same; Tennessee). 
Since 1950, three additional states have adopted jury trials for equity proceedings. Ala-
bama adopted it by decision if money damages are sought. See Whitman v. Mashburn, 238 So. 
2d 709, 715 (Ala. 1970) (bill in equity seeking accounting and money damages entitled to jury 
trial); Frank W. Donaldson & J. Michael Walls, Merger of Law and Equity in Alabama-Some 
Considerations, 33 ALA. LAW. 134, 143-44 (1972). Arizona by decision requires fact issues in 
equitable cases to be tried by jury. See Haynie v. Taylor, 213 P.2d 684, 689-90 (Ariz. 1950). 
Louisiana requires jury trials in all civil cases with enumerated exceptions, including probate, 
injunctive, divorce and federal admiralty matters and where denied by law, LA. CODE CIV. 
PRoc. ANN. arts. 1731, 1732 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991), including federal law, see Cramer v. 
Association Life Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 533, 541 (La. 1990) (courts deny jury trial under federal 
law for ERISA claims), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1391 (1991). 
184. See Elgin v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 786 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1989) (refusing to render on reformed cause of action in jury trial since defendant then could 
have removed to federal court to avoid jury; health plan). · 
185. E.g., Haywood v. Russell Corp., 584 So. 2d 1291, 1298 (Ala. 1991) (following Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ala. 1990); disability plan); Ex parte 
Ward, 448 So. 2d 349, 351-52 (Ala. 1984) (ERISA plan contractual so jury trial; health plan); 
see Hoffman v. Chandler, 431 So. 2d 499, 500 (Ala. 1983) (jury trial not questioned; medical 
plan). 
186. See Anderson v. Chatham, 379 S.E.2d 793, 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (jury trial not 
questioned; retirement plan); TRW, Inc. v. Ebersole, 341 S.E.2d 267,268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) 
(remand for jury trial; disability plan). 
187. Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 381 S.E.2d 330, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) 
(medical plan). 
188. See Campbell v. Precision Rubber Prods. Corp., 737 S.W.2d 283, 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1987) (employee lawsuit to reinstate participation in health plan; chancellor decided without 
jury as waived). 
189. Burghart v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 806 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) 
(entitled to jury trial for ERISA action under long-term disability plan); see Petrolite Corp. v. 
Barnhouse, 812 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (jury trial not questioned; retirement plan); 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Forbau, 808 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (same; medical plan); 
Felts v. Graphic Arts Employee Benefit Trust, 680 S.W.2d 891, 892-93 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) 
(same; health plan). 
190. Cramer v. Association Life Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 533, 534 (La. 1990), cert. denied, Ill 
s. Ct. 1391 (1991). 
191. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1732(7) (West 1990 & Supp. 1991). 
192. 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). 
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limitation. 193 
IV. THE PROPER SOLUTION 
Resolution of whether there is a right to a jury trial in benefits-due 
cases depends on two investigations. Both are essentially the same under 
either the federal system or the state systems. Since ERISA contains no 
express provision granting a jury trial for benefits-due lawsuits, did Con-
gress impliedly intend for courts to try such lawsuits by jury?194 If not, 
are benefits-due lawsuits analogous to a type of action that requires a jury 
trial under some constitution or statute?195 
A. Implied Congressional Intent 
Examination of ERISA's legislative history reveals four items of an 
implied intent by Congress to grant rights to a jury trial for benefits-due 
lawsuits. First, Congress expressed an intention not only to preserve pre-
ERISA state remedies, but to expand them. 196 Those remedies were con-
tractual and generally tried by jury.197 Second, the statutory scheme pro-
vided for a contractual approach to employee benefit programs and 
Congress recognized that participant-beneficiary rights under these pro-
grams arise contractually and hence carry a right to a jury trial. 198 
Third, Congress desired to increase legal remedies for participant-benefi-
ciaries suing for benefits due. 199 Legal remedies mean a jury trial. 
Lastly, Congress, rather than work out a complete set of new ERISA 
procedures, incorporated LMRA procedures into ERISA actions, which 
treat employee benefit programs as contracts with a right to a jury 
trial.200 
1. Preservation of state remedies 
When Congress passed ERISA, it desired to expand, not constrict, 
the remedies already available under state law for benefits-due lawsuits. 
Committee reports in both houses clearly express this goal: 
The intent of the Committee [in providing the benefits-due law-
suit] is to provide the full range oflegal and equitable remedies 
193. Cramer, 569 So. 2d at 534 (no right to jury trial for ERISA claims as denied under 
federal law). 
194. See infra notes 199-271 and accompanying text. 
195. See infra notes 272-311 and accompanying text. 
196. See infra notes 201-16 and accompanying text. 
197. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. 
198. See infra notes 217-32 and accompanying text. 
199. See infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text. 
200. See infra notes 242-71 and accompanying text. 
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available in both state and federal courts to remove jurisdic-
tional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to 
have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibili-
ties under state law for recovery of benefits due to 
participants. 201 
ERISA was intended to improve the remedies already available under 
state law. 
The early state approaches to handling benefits-due lawsuits re-
volved around misconceptions concerning whether the employee benefit 
program was a contract or a trust.202 The problem of whether benefits-
due lawsuits entail jury trials arose because most employee benefit pro-
grams were dual in nature, possessing a contractual plan instrument set-
ting forth the participation requirements and benefits provided as well as 
a trust instrument setting forth the funding mechanism. 203 Some plans 
are unfunded and thus have no trust element.204 Unfortunately, state 
courts, rather than recognize this dual nature, focused only on one as-
pect. Most state courts finally settled on the contract approach, 205 but a 
few settled on the trust approach206 as did some federal courts for 
LMRA actions.207 The contractual approach was so predominant that 
the United States Supreme Court has described pre-ERISA employee 
benefit law as contractual in nature.208 
201. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 171, at 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4655; S. 
REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871. 
The jurisdictional obstacles concerned such things as legal rules against suing nonresident 
trusts. See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 310-11 (6th Cir. 1974). Even benefits-due 
lawsuits under LMRA met jurisdictional hurdles, such as insufficient violations under LMRA 
§ 301. See, e.g., Bass v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local No. 582, 630 F.2d 1058, 
1066-67 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 279-81 for various procedural obstacles. 
202. See, e.g., Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 10 COLUM. L. 
REv. 909, 916-24 (1970) (explaining that participant-beneficiaries used contract law to recover 
denied benefits and used trust law supplementally to prevent mishandling of funds before par-
ticipant-beneficiaries had right to draw on those funds). 
203. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
204. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989) (severance pay 
plan from employer's general assets). 
Employers pay benefits for unfunded plans solely from employer assets. Starting in 1921, 
income tax law required tax-sheltered plans to have trusts, Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 
§ 219(f), 42 Stat. 227, 247, and in 1947 LMRA required multi-employer plans to have trusts, 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1988). 
205. See infra note 208, 280. 
206. See infra note 281. 
207. See supra note 85 and infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
208. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112; see also McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 691 F. Supp. 
1314, 1315 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (inconsistent with ERISA's goals for circuit courts to claim 
ERISA took away right to jury trial participant-beneficiaries had under pre-ERISA law), 
ajf'd, 874 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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As the legal rules under contract law and trust law are basically the 
same, 209 the significance of the different approaches lies in whether the 
participant-beneficiary has a right to a jury trial. Some states grant a 
right to a jury trial only for cases at law, namely contracts. 21° For those 
states granting a right to a jury trial for cases in equity, namely trusts,211 
the distinction is of little import. Since most states viewed employee ben-
efit plans as contractual, most granted the right to jury trial for benefits-
due lawsuits.212 Only a few viewed the matter under trust law and so 
denied jury trials.213 
"209. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
211. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
212. Since the state theory was that employee benefit programs were contracts, they permit-
ted a jury trial without questioning it. E.g., Wayte v. Rollins Int'l, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 215 
Cal. Rptr. 59, 63 (1985) (pre-ERISA plan contractual so jury trial; employee sued plan for 
medical benefit); Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 133 A.2d 894, 894 (Conn. 1957) (former 
employee sued for pension payment from pension plan); Cotton v. Edward Don & Co., 245 So. 
2d 881, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (former employee sued employer for vested share in 
profit-sharing plan); General Electric Co. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) 
(former employee sued employer for disability benefit from pension plan); Montgomery Ward 
& Co. v. Williams, 47 N.W.2d 607, 608 (Mich. 1951) (employer sued employee to recover 
amount wrongfully paid under health and accident insurance plan); Rakness v. Swift & Co., 
175 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 1970) (employee sued employer for denied disability benefit from 
retirement plan); Blacik v. Canco Division-American Can Co., 156 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Minn. 
1968) (former employee sued employer for additional retirement benefit and vacation pay); 
Stopford v. Boonton Molding Co., 265 A.2d 657, 659 (N.J. 1970) (retiree sued employer for 
anticipatory breach ofvested contractual right to pension from pension plan); Hindle v. Morri-
sion Steel Co., 223 A.2d 193, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (former employee sued 
employer to recover contractual rights in retirement fund); Gearns v. Commercial Cable Co., 
42 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (App. Div. 1943) (employee sued employer for monthly payment due 
under retirement plan), a.ff'd, 293 N.Y. 105 (1944); Going v. Southern Mills' Employees' 
Trust, 281 P.2d 762, 762 (Okla. 1955) (employee sued trust to compel payment of share in 
profit-sharing plan); Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 431 P.2d 130, 130 (Utah 1967) 
(employee sued employer for disability benefits from pension plan). 
North Carolina and Texas courts, which permit jury trials also in equity, see supra note 
183, also followed the contractual approach to jury trials. E.g., Bradlye v. Pritchard, 118 
S.E.2d 422, 425 (N.C. 1961) (former employee sued trustee for cash value of policy on life); 
Neuhoff Bros. Packers Management Corp. v. Wilson, 453 S.W.2d 472, 472 (Tex. 1970) (former 
employee sued trustee for benefit due from profit-sharing plan); Hexter v. Powell, 475 S.W.2d 
857, 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (former employee sued trustees for benefit from terminated 
pension plan); Bruner v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 455 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) 
(former employee sued trustee for disability benefits from retirement plan); Long v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 442 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (widow sued employer for death 
benefit under employee benefit plan). 
213. Those courts using the theory that employee benefit programs were trusts permitted 
trials before the judge without questioning it. E.g., Kennet v. United Mine Workers, 183 F. 
Supp. 315, 316 (D.D.C. 1960) (tried without jury; retiree suing for benefit termination from 
multi-employer plan); Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D.D.C. 1958) (judge weighed 
evidence for former employee suing for pension benefit from multi-employer plan); Hobbs v. 
Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 284 (D.D.C. 1958) (same); Ex parte Garner, 190 So. 2d 544, 546 
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When Congress passes new legislation to solve a problem, courts 
presume it considered prior case law relating to the problem.214 The con-
gressional reference to increasing the remedies of benefits-due lawsuits in 
state court by removing jurisdictional hurdles acknowledges that state 
courts tried these cases under a contract theory with a jury trial.215 Con-
gress therefore intended ERISA to expand the right to a jury trial 
granted by the states in the pre-ERISA benefits-due lawsuit. The drastic 
curtailment of this right engineered by the court in Wardle v. Central 
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund 216 violates this con-
gressional directive. 
2. Statutory scheme 
ERISA specifically acknowledges the dual nature of employee bene-
fit plans through a contractual part and a separate trust part.217 ERISA 
clearly delineates one of the two instruments as the one governing opera-
tions, 218 and names the plan fiduciary separate from the trust instru-
(Ala. 1966) (former employee sued trustee for benefit from profit-sharing plan; case transferred 
from law to equity; presumed non jury trial as before Alabama required jury trial in equity; see 
supra note 183); Barlow v. Roche, 161 A.2d 58, 63 (D.C. 1960) (tried in equity even though 
brought as action at law for monies due and owing under multi-employer health plan); Farrish 
v. Kennedy, 105 A.2d 67, 68 (Pa. 1954) (employee sued trustees for retirement pension from 
multi-employer plan in equity). But see Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'! Bank, 297 F. Supp. 485, 
489 (D. Minn. 1969) (former employees' suit for vested benefit upon profit-sharing plan termi-
nation bas right to jury trial under trust law's legal remedy). 
214. E.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 
(1986); District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1941); Blake v. McKim, 103 
U.S. 336, 339 (1880); 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.Dl 
(4th ed. 1984); see Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 759 (1988) (Congress 
presumed to know about labor union practices when passing labor laws). 
215. See infra note 229 and accompanying text for congressional reference to pre-ERISA 
pension law as contractual. 
216. 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). 
217. See 26 C.P.R. § 601.201(o)(3)(xviii)(a) (1991) (make available to participants for de-
termination letter "updated copy of the plan and the related trust agreement (if any)"); 29 
C.P.R. § 2520.104b-1(b)(3) (1991) (make available to participants during reasonable times 
plan documents consisting of "plan description, latest annual report, and the bargaining agree-
ment, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is established or 
operated."). 
218. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 402, 29 U.S. C. § 1102(a) (1988) 
("Every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a • . • plan 
instrument" that shall provide for the operation and administration of the plan); see id. 
§§ 1015, 2003(a), 26 U.S.C. §§ 414(g)(1), 4975(d)(8)(C); id. §§ 3, 104, 405, 408, 414, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1002(16)(A)(i), 1024(a)(1)(B), (2), (4), (6), 1105(c)(1), 1108(b)(8)(C), 1114(b)(2) (all refer-
ring to instrument under which benefit program is established, maintained or operated); see 
also id. § 404, 29 U.S. C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (indicating that instruments of benefit program are 
plural). 
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ment.219 ERISA also clearly delineates one of the two instruments as 
governing the program's assets.220 So ERISA recognizes that a part of 
the employee benefit plan is contractual in nature. 
Clever arguments cannot avoid that contractual nature, and hence 
possible jury trials, by placing participation requirements in the trust in-
strument. ERISA merely defines the plan instrument, the contract, as 
that portion of the employee benefit program including participation pro-
visions, regardless of the label on the actual instrument. 
Congress made clear that employee benefit programs did not consist 
solely of a trust document governed by trust law.221 Congressional re-
ports indicate that trust law alone was inadequate to safeguard partici-
pant-beneficiaries' rights222 and that the LMRA standards, namely the 
arbitrary and capricious review standard, were not good enough for 
ERISA.223 Furthermore, courts were not to apply just pre-ERISA law. 
Instead, Congress directed them to take into consideration the special 
differences between employee benefit trusts and traditional testamentary 
trusts.224 These differences should at least take into account that: (1) the 
employer has a continuing economic interest in the program to reduce its 
costs since the employer is ultimately liable for its benefits and costs; (2) 
the employee's interest in the program represents the employee's deferred 
compensation; and (3) the plan administrator's review process is geared 
to justify its own prior determination in a nonneutral fashion. 225 Thus, 
219. Id. § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a); see also S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4978 n.2 (trust sometimes means plan whether or not in trust 
form). 
220. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988) 
("[T]rustee shall be ... named in the trust instrument" and shall have authority to manage and 
control the plan's assets.); see also id. §§ 403, 422, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1105(a)(1), (c)(5), 
1403(b)(1) (all referring to trust instrument); id. § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (indicating 
that instruments of benefit program are plural); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 26 
U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(2), 501(c)(22)(D) (1988) (referring to employee benefit program's trust 
instrument). 
221. See supra notes 217-20, infra note 229 and accompanying text for congressional recog-
nition of non-trust employee benefit program documents, some governed by contract law. 
222. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 171, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4650 
("Conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries."). 
223. /d. at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4642 ("[LMRA] is not intended to estab-
lish nor does it provide standards for the preservation of vested benefits, funding adequacy, 
security of investment, or fiduciary conduct."). 
224. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 302, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5083 ("The conferees expect that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other 
fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit 
plans."). 
225. See Flint, supra note 25, at 173; Langbein, supra note 28, at 211-12. 
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Congress recognized that employee benefit programs were far more than 
just trusts. 
Congress provided that the rights of the participant-beneficiary arise 
in the contractual plan instrument relating to the establishment of the 
benefit program.226 These rights, under the deferred wage theory of pre-
ERISA law, were contractual.227 They represented an exchange of the 
promise of deferred wages, the benefits, for the consideration of present 
services.228 Congress recognized these rights as contractual in its com-
mittee reports: 
In almost every instance, participants lose their benefits not be-
cause of some violation of federal law, but rather because of the 
manner in which the plan is executed with respect to its con-
tractual requirements of vesting or funding. 229 
Moreover, these congressional committee reports specifically acknowl-
edge that ERISA adopted the deferred wage theory for participant-bene-
ficiary rights under employee benefit plans: "[ERISA] presumes that 
promised pension benefits are in the form of a conditional deferred 
wage."230 Thus the document that creates the rights of the participant-
beneficiaries, the one that establishes the plan, is contractual in nature 
under the congressional explanation. Moreover, it is under that plan 
document that participant-beneficiaries sue in a benefits-due lawsuit/31 
not under the trust instrument. The trust's only involvement in the bene-
fits-due lawsuit is that it is contractually obligated to satisfy the partici-
pant-beneficiary's judgment. 232 Congress thus expected courts to enforce 
these contractual rights through the benefits-due lawsuit under contract 
law, which generally entails a right to a jury trial. 
226. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988) (only reference to enforceable rights of participant-beneficiary as arising 
under terms of plan instrument). 
227. See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text for congressional recognition of the 
deferred wage theory giving rise to contractual rights. 
228. See Comment, Consideration for the Employer's Promise of a Voluntary Pension Plan, 
23 U. CHI. L. REv. 96, 99-103 (1955) (explaining contract theory of employee benefit plans 
with consideration in either longevity of service or in present services for deferred wages). 
229. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 171, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4643; S. 
REP. No. 127, supra note 201, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4841-42. 
230. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 171, at 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4651. 
231. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988) ("[T]o recover benefits due [the participant-beneficiary] under the terms 
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan."). 
232. See supra note 144 for the legal remedy of the participant-beneficiary against the 
trustee. 
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3. The increase in legal remedies 
Another strand of legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended the benefits-due lawsuit to provide the full range of legal remedies 
available to participant-beneficiaries.233 The word "legal" in the legisla-
tive history is a term of art that means the right to a jury trial. 234 The 
Wardle interpretation of limiting the benefits-due lawsuit to the ex-
tremely narrow trust legal remedy235 violates this congressional directive. 
Wardle fails to provide that full range, which certainly includes the con-
tractual remedies associated with the contractual nature of employee 
benefit plans recognized by Congress. The Stamps interpretation, in con-
trast, provides that full range of legal remedies. 236 
Under the congressional directive, courts are to treat benefits-due 
lawsuits as contractual, providing the full range of legal remedies as dic-
tated by contract law.237 ERISA contains much language about trust 
law,238 however, it is always in connection with fiduciary responsibili-
ties.239 Contract law ordinarily provides a low standard of behavior.240 
ERISA merely requires the higher altruistic standard of fiduciary behav-
ior from the parties to the employee benefit program, namely the sponsor 
and the plan administrator. 241 Congress's efforts to raise the standard of 
fiduciary behavior should not be construed as an intent to deprive the 
participant-beneficiaries of their right to a jury trial in obtaining money 
damages for benefit denials. 
4. Adoption of LMRA procedures 
A fourth strand of legislative history indicates that courts should 
apply LMRA procedures to ERISA actions that mandate a right to a 
jury trial. The conference committee report on ERISA states that: 
233. See supra note 201 and accompanying text for the portion of the congressional com-
mittee reports supporting the use of legal remedies. 
234. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978) (Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988))). 
235. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
238. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 28, at 209-11. 
239. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 533, 
supra note 171, at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4649 (ERISA "codifies and makes 
applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of 
trusts."); S. REP. No. 127, supra note 201, at 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4865 
(same). 
240. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 829-32 (1983} (explaining 
that contract law does not go beyond morals of marketplace, while fiduciary law is altruistic). 
241. See supra notes 239-40 for congressional intention to incorporate into ERISA fiduci-
ary law and explanation that fiduciary law is altruistic. 
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[S]uits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover 
benefits under the plan which do not involve application of 
[ERISA's] provisions ... may be brought ... also in State 
courts . . . . All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be 
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in simi-
lar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 194 7. 242 
Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., then chairman of the Senate Commit-
tee on Labor and Public Welfare, 243 co-sponsor of the original draft of 
the ERISA legislation244 and floor manager of the bill/45 explained the 
legislation similarly.246 The United States Supreme Court stated explic-
itly that this legislative history could not be a "more specific reference" 
to LMRA procedural rules.247 Consequently, the Supreme Court has 
grafted the preemption removal procedures of LMRA onto ERISA ac-
tions. 248 Thus, in handling benefits-due lawsuits in the absence of express 
ERISA provisions concerning procedural matters, courts should examine 
the corresponding LMRA practice. 
With respect to the right to a jury trial, some courts have tried to 
obfuscate the true LMRA practice. In Wardle, for example, the court 
disparaged this legislative history as indicative of another matter49 and 
cited the only court cases involving LMRA that denied the right to a jury 
trial for benefits-due lawsuits250 for another proposition.251 The reason is 
clear. If courts examined that practice, they would conclude Wardle's 
denial of the right to a jury trial is erroneous. In Stamps the court sug-
gested the correct analysis, but failed to explain it fully.252 
242. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 76-77, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 5107. 
243. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. XCII. 
244. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Theodore P. Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarron-Ferguson Act: The 
Need for Congressional Action, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 61 (1979). 
245. Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statu-
tory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109, 113 (1985). 
246. 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974) ("It is intended that such [ERISA] actions will be 
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those brought 
under§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act."). 
247. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987). 
248. Id. (adopting LMRA Avco rule for benefits-due lawsuits). See supra note 98 for a 
discussion of removal of benefits-due lawsuits. 
249. Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); see supra note 171. 
250. Incidentally, these cases were from federal district courts and not circuit courts. 
251. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829; see supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
252. Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council, 431 F. Supp. 745, 746-47 (E.D. Mich. 
1972); see supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
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LMRA section 301 provides that litigants may enforce labor con-
tract matters in federal court253 or state court. 254 The Supreme Court, 
prior to ERISA's passage, held that the word "contract" in LMRA sec-
tion 301 encompasses more than just the collective bargaining agree-
ments.255 Further, in dicta the Court indicated that the term "contracts" 
includes employee benefit plans mentioned in the collective bargaining 
agreement.256 In fact, this reasoning provides the very jurisdictional ba-
sis under LMRA for federal courts to even consider disputes over multi-
employer employee benefit plans.257 Consequently, courts before and af-
ter ERISA have held that both employee benefit plans and trusts are 
encompassed in contracts under LMRA section 301.258 In fact, the only 
courts not to so hold are essentially those three district court opinions 
seized by the court in Wardle to throttle the right to a jury trial.259 
Those cases were decided in the late 1970s based on one 1960 district 
court opinion applying trust law to a multi-employer pension plan.260 In 
1962, the Supreme Court pronounced that for section 301 purposes em-
253. See supra note 46. 
254. See supra note 51. 
255. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 26-28 (1962). 
256. Allied Chern. & Alkali Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 
157, 176-77 n.17 (1971). 
257. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1977). 
258. Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.) (en bane) (contracts 
include pension trusts), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060, 
1061 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); Rehmar, 555 F.2d at 1367 (plan enforceable under LMRA § 301); 
Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 161 (9th Cir.) (contract consists of welfare trust plus collec-
tive bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); International Union, United 
Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688, 691 (6th 
Cir. 1963) (rights of employee to pension benefit grow out of collective bargaining agreement); 
Vallejo v. American R.R., 188 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1951) (treats employee benefit plan 
under contract theory); American Fed'n of Labor v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535, 
538 (6th Cir. 1950) (contract includes trust since collective bargaining agreement refers to 
trust); NYSA-ILA GAl Fund v. Poggi, 617 F. Supp. 847, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (contract 
includes collective bargaining agreement plus pension plan); Stewart v. Trustees, Masters, 
Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 432 F. Supp. 742, 748 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (describes plan as pen-
sion provisions of collective bargaining agreement), vacated on other grounds, 608 F.2d 776 
(9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. DCA Food Indus., 269 F. Supp. 863, 868 (D. Md. 1967) (contract 
includes provisions of pension fund established by collective bargaining agreement); New York 
City Omnibus Corp. v. Quill, 73 N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (Sup. Ct.) (treats employee benefit plan 
under contract theory), aff'd, 74 N.Y.S.2d 925 (App. Div. 1947), modified, 78 N.E.2d 859, 
860 (N.Y. 1948) (same). 
259. See, e.g., Davis v. Huge, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2234 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 1975); Genesta 
v. San Diego County Laborers' Pension Plan, 87 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~~ 11702, 22827 (S.D. Cal. 
Oct. 5, 1979); Porter v. Central States Pension Fund, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3210 (N.D. Iowa 
June 26, 1978). 
260. Sichko v. Lewis, 191 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Pa. 1960); see also Rice v. Hutton, 487 F. 
Supp. 278, 279-80 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (no right to jury trial for review of pension denial since 
arbitrary and capricious review standard is question of law). 
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ployee benefit programs are contracts. 261 Reliance on an opinion im-
pliedly overruled by the nation's highest court can hardly serve as legal 
precedent. 262 
Circuit court opinions since the Supreme Court's pronouncement 
have considered employee benefit plans under LMRA section 301 as con-
tracts for purposes of determining the right to a jury trial. 263 These 
courts have required jury trials when requested for employees suing for 
benefits due,264 for trustees suing for delinquent contributions265 and 
261. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 26-28 (1962). 
262. See supra note 155. 
263. See infra notes 264-68 for courts allowing jury trials. See supra notes 259-60 for the 
few courts denying jury trials. 
264. E.g., Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.) (en bane) (early 
retirement benefits), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Wise v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding 
Co., 751 F. Supp. 90, 93 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (employee sued pension trustees to establish service 
credits; sued employer, pension trustees and union to compel contributions on behalf; denied 
jury trial under ERISA but granted jury trial as LMRA § 301 claim); Senn v. AMCA Int'l, 
No. 87-C-1353, 1989 WL 248487, at *11 (E.D. Wis. May 9, 1989) (health and life insurance 
benefits); Local 836 v. UAW, 670 F. Supp. 697, 707-08 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (retirees sued for 
unpaid retirement benefits); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash. 
1986) (retirees sued for wrongful termination of benefits); Smith v. ABS Indus., 653 F. Supp. 
94 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (retirees sued employers to establish right to medical and life insurance 
benefits); Oil, Chern. & Atomic Workers Local 423 v. Texaco, 88 F.R.D. 86, 89 (E.D. Tex. 
1980) (union for employees sued employer for reducing pension benefit); see Zuniga v. United 
Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1987) (jury trial not questioned for employee suing for 
sick leave benefits); Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 1980) (jury 
trial not questioned for employee suing for monthly benefit); see also Coleman v. Kroger Co., 
399 F. Supp. 724, 732 (W.D. Va. 1975) (used advisory jury for employee suing for disability 
pension cast as breach of fair representation case against union). Contra Hechenberger v. 
Western Elec. Co., 570 F. Supp. 820, 822 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (employees sued for workers com-
pensation reduced by plan benefits; no jury trial under LMRA on basis of ERISA law), ajf'd, 
742 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985). 
One commentator asserted that since (1) no court had provided a jury trial in a LMRA 
benefits-due lawsuit as of 1981 and (2) several courts had tried such cases without jury trials, 
see, e.g., Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1978) (pension benefit); Lugo v. Employ-
ees Retirement Fund of Illumination Prods. Indus., 529 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976) (same); Haynes v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp. 331, 332 (D.D.C. 1969); 
Bolgar v. Lewis, 238 F. Supp. 595, 596 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (same), there probably was not a right 
to a jury trial in such actions. See Comment, The Right to a Civil Jury Trial in ERISA Section 
502(a}(l)(B) Actions: Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 
65 MINN. L. REv. 1208, 1211 n.21 (1981). Presumedly, the argument would be that what the 
law is, is best reflected in the practices of the lawyers as being their understanding of it. See 
WILLIAM E. NELSON & JOHN P. REID, THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 
268, 326 (1985) (describing John Reid's use of travel journals to glean law). However, the 
more likely explanation is the litigant's waiver of his or her jury trial. All constitutional provi-
sions preserving the right to a jury trial in civil cases permit its waiver. E.g., ARK. CoNST. art. 
2, § 7 (specifically providing for waiver); Duognan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 198 {1927) 
(under U.S. CONST. amend. VII). Some reasons for waiving jury trials are lower costs and 
speedier trials. RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACTICE 30·31 (1986). 
Cases in which jury trials occurred reflect a more accurate picture of the law since one 
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wrongfully paid benefits.266 These courts grant jury trials even in the 
situations the court in Wardle abhorred-namely, when the jury must 
make an arbitrary and capricious finding267 and when the court must 
order future benefits.268 The only situation in which these courts deny a 
jury trial under LMRA section 301 is when the litigants clearly seek only 
equitable relief under the contract. 269 Thus, the courts have preserved 
the right to a jury trial for benefits-due lawsuits under LMRA section 
301. 
Courts should presume that when Congress passes new legislation to 
solve a perceived problem, Congress considered prior case law relating to 
the problem.270 In 1974, when Congress referred to LMRA section 301, 
it was aware of the Supreme Court's 1962 pronouncement and the cases 
following it announcing that employee benefit plans under LMRA sec-
tion 301 are contracts, and that such a pronouncement entails a right to 
jury trial.271 Congress could not have provided a clearer indication that 
ERISA benefits-due lawsuits also entail a right to a jury trial. 
B. Other Statutory and Constitutional Requirements 
Constitutional and statutory considerations are unnecessary because 
party definitely seeks to avoid the jury trial. However, this also is a defective indication of 
what the law is since parties may consent to jury trials even when there is no right to a jury 
trial. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c). 
265. E.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. Keystone Heating & Air Conditioning, 934 
F.2d 35, 37 (3d Cir. 1991); Bugher v. Feightner, 722 F.2d 1356, 1358 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984); Oregon Laborers-Employers Trust Funds v. Pacific Fence & 
Wire, 726 F. Supp. 786, 788 (D. Or. 1989); see Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 
462 (1960) (permitting jury trial without challenge); Lewis v. Lowry, 322 F.2d 453, 454 (4th 
Cir. 1963) (same); Lewis v. Mears, 297 F.2d 101, 102 (3d Cir. 1961) (same), cert. denied, 369 
U.S. 873 (1962); Lewis v. Kepple, 185 F. Supp. 884, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (same), aff'd, 287 
F.2d 409, 410 (3d Cir. 1961). 
266. See Trucking Employees ofN. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Vrablick, 425 A.2d 1068, 
1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (jury trial not questioned). 
267. See Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 1980). 
268. See id. 
269. E.g., United Steelworkers v. Connors Steel, 847 F.2d 707, 709 (11th Cir. 1988) (trust-
ees sought injunction to prevent plan termination), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); Souza v. 
Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust, 663 F.2d 942, 944-45 (9th Cir. 
1981) (injunction to stop enforcement of age requirement for vesting); Nedd v. United Mine 
Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1977) (employees sued trustees for accounting), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Amcast Indus., 634 F. 
Supp. 1135, 1144 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (injunction to prevent termination of early retirement sup-
plemental benefits); Nedd v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 74, 77 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (same), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Paddock v. L.W. Hembree Co., 763 P.2d 411, 413 (Or. Ct. App. 
1988) (same). 
270. See supra note 214. 
271. See supra note 264. 
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ERISA impliedly grants the right to a jury trial. Nevertheless, even 
these considerations suggest that benefits-due lawsuits entail the right to 
a jury trial. 
These considerations are irrelevant in: (1) the six states already 
treating benefits-due lawsuits as subject to the right to a jury trial because 
they grant jury trials in both legal and equitable actions;272 and (2) the 
two states lacking both constitutional and statutory provisions preserving 
the right to trial by jury in civil actions. 273 Louisiana's statutory provi-
sion will be invoked since its courts only deny jury trials for benefits-due 
lawsuits due to federal law. 274 Therefore, these considerations are rele-
vant to the federal system and the remaining forty-two state systems, all 
under their respective constitutional provisions. 
The investigation of constitutional provisions under either the fed-
eral system or these state systems is the same, because all the relevant 
state constitutional provisions operate similarly to the Seventh Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, 275 except for the time and place 
reviewed. 276 Analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions reveals 
that the benefits-due lawsuit is an action and a sought remedy that is 
legal in nature; therefore, these constitutional provisions preserve the 
right to a jury trial for the benefits-due lawsuit. 
1. The contractual nature of benefits-due lawsuits 
The benefits-due lawsuit as an action is contractual, rather than 
trust-like in nature.277 The participant-beneficiary's rights arise solely 
because of an exchange of services for the promised benefit from the em-
ployer. After the development of the first private employee benefit pro-
grams with exclusively employer contributions about 1875,278 jurists 
have struggled with various theories of law to apply to the relationship, 
such as the gratuity theory,279 the contractual theory/80 the trust the-
272. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra note 176. 
274. See supra note 190-93 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra notes 116-21, 176-82 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
277. See infra notes 278-88 and accompanying text. 
278. See WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCINE P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 27 (1976) (describing first noncontributory private plan in North America as that of 
American Express in 1875). 
279. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944); Hughes v. Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, 108 F. Supp. 303, 305 (N.D. Ill.), vacated on other grounds, 199 F.2d 295 
(7th Cir. 1952); In re Schenectady Ry., 93 F. Supp. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (for nonunion 
employees); In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 49 F. Supp. 405, 406 (E.D. Mo. 1943); Fickling v. 
Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 117 
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ory281 and the estoppel theory.282 However, only the contractual theory 
gained such near universal acceptance that both the Supreme Court283 
N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954); Umshler v. Umshler, 76 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1947); Dolan v. Heller Bros., 104 A.2d 860, 861 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1954); Korb v. 
Brooklyn Edison Co., 15 N.Y.S.2d 557, 557 (App. Div. 1939); Burgess v. First Nat'l Bank, 220 
N.Y.S. 134, 139 (App. Div. 1927); Dolge v. Dolge, 75 N.Y.S. 386, 387 (App. Div. 1902); 
McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 99 (App. Div. 1898), aff'd, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 
1901); MacCabe v. Consolidated Edison Co., 30 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (City Ct. 1941). 
The gratuity theory treated the employer's promise to pay benefits as a promise to make a 
gift in the future. The promise was unenforceable until the gift was actually made, effectively 
providing a block to the participant-beneficiary's recovery. The gratuity theory was popular 
with courts since many plans had provisions stating that the employee acquired no enforceable 
contractual rights under the plan. See, e.g., Menke, 140 F.2d at 790; Fickling, 179 S.E. at 
583. 
280. See, e.g., West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 2d 597, 603-05, 225 P.2d 978, 982-
83 (1951) (dicta); Bos v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 565, 568, 224 P.2d 386, 
388 (1950); Magee v. San Francisco Bar Pilots Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 88 Cal. App. 2d 
278, 286-88, 198 P.2d 933, 938-39 (1948); Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 722, 197 
P.2d 807, 813-15 (1948); Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150, 154 (Ill. 1928); Askinas v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 111 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Mass. 1953); Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 
264 N.W. 385, 386 (Mich. 1936); Gearns v. Commercial Cable Co., 32 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (Civ. 
Ct. 1942), aff'd, 42 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div. 1943), aff'd, 56 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1944); Wallace 
v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937); Sigman v. 
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937); Wilson v. Rudolph Wur-
litzer Co., 194 N.E. 441,443 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934); David v. Veitscher Magnesitwerke Actien 
Gesellschaft, 35 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. 1944); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Jones, 103 S.W.2d 1043, 1045 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Schofield v. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Inst., 39 P.2d 342, 344 (Utah 
1934); Gilbert v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 171 S.E. 814, 816 (W.Va. 1933); see also supra note 84. 
Under the contractual theory, the employee's continued employment constituted consid-
eration for the employer's promise to pay the benefit. The drawback to the contractual theory 
was that, until ERISA, the employer could place sufficient conditions in the plan to defeat 
enforcement of the contract. The employee-beneficiary had no rights until he satisfied all con-
ditions, including age. See, e.g., Wallace, 13 N.E.2d at 143; David, 35 A.2d at 349. The 
contractual theory was by far the most popular with the courts. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989) (describing pre-ERISA law as contractual). 
281. See, e.g., Ex parte Garner, 190 So. 2d 544, 546 (Ala. 1966). 
The trust theory treated the establishment of the plan as also establishing a trust for the 
payment of the benefits to the employee-beneficiaries. Unfortunately, most employers never 
actually paid monies to any trust prior to LMRA's requirements to do so for multi-employer 
plans. The result was failure of the employees to recover benefits under a trust theory since 
there was no trust res. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jackson & Squire, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 354, 359-60 
(W.D. Ark. 1949), appeal dismissed, 181 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1950); Gearns v. Commercial 
Cable Co., 42 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (App. Div. 1943), aff'd, 56 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1944). As a result, 
most cases adopting this approach are LMRA cases. See supra note 85. 
282. See, e.g., Sessions v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 611, 617, 118 P.2d 
935, 939-40 (1941). 
Estoppel theory held that the participant-beneficiary's right to the benefit arose because of 
his reliance on the promise in continuing his work with that employer. Unfortunately, this 
also seldom led to recovery of the benefit because the reliance must be reasonable. Employers 
frequently made statements destroying that reasonable reliance. See, e.g., Hughes v. Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954). 
283. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112; see also Puz v. Bessemer Cement, 700 F. Supp. 267, 268 (W.D. 
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and Congress284 have recognized it. 
From the employee's perspective the pension plan differs little from 
the situation in which an annuity contract is purchased from an insur-
ance company. ERISA requires retirement plan benefits to be paid in the 
form of a joint-and-survivor annuity, unless the participant and spouse 
elect otherwise.285 One of the possible elections is typically a lump-sum 
distribution.286 Similarly, the welfare plan differs little from the situation 
in which the participant-beneficiary purchases a medical policy or disa-
bility policy from an insurance company. The only real difference, from 
the employee's viewpoint, is that for the employee benefit program (1) 
the employee pays labor and not the monies the labor produced, (2) the 
employee makes an exchange with the employer and not an insurance 
company, and (3) the employee's risk is the employer's bankruptcy and 
not the insurance company's bankruptcy. In fact, nothing in ERISA pre-
vents the employer in the employee benefit program situation from acting 
solely as a middleman in an insurance policy situation. Frequently, em-
ployers fund employee benefit programs merely by purchasing annuity, 
disability or group medical policies, 287 rather than through a trust. Thus 
Pa. 1988) (describing benefits-due lawsuit as contractual in nature); Jordan v. Reliable Life 
Ins., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (describing ERISA causes of action as tradition-
ally legal). 
284. See supra note 229-30 and accompanying text. 
285. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 1021(a), 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(11) 
(1988); id. § 205, 29 u.s.c. § 1055. 
286. See id. § 2005, 26 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4)(A) (taxation of lump-sum distribution from re-
tirement plan). 
287. Fully insured retirement plans are exempt from the minimum funding requirements 
for defined benefit and money purchase pension plans. /d. § 1011, 26 U.S.C. § 412(h)(2); id. 
§ 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 323, reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5085 ("[A] plan may be invested wholly in insurance or annuity con· 
tracts without violating the diversification rules ••. . ");see also Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hamilton Steel Prods., Inc., 448 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1971) (employer funded pension plan 
with group annuity policy). A fully insured plan is one that (1) is funded solely with individual 
insurance or annuity contracts that call for level periodic premiums that are paid-up, (2) calls 
for a benefit equal to that provided by the insurance contract, and (3) prohibits security inter-
ests in and loans against the insurance contracts. Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, § 1013, 26 U.S.C. § 412(i) (1988); id. § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(b); 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.412(i)-1(c) (1988). Reporting requirements are also simplified for fully-insured plans. 
They merely report data supplied by the insurance company. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-5 (1991). 
Other retirement plans may invest some of their assets in life and health insurance and 
annuity contracts. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 314, reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5094 ("[ERISA] does not prohibit a plan from purchasing life insurance, 
health insurance, or annuities from the employer that maintains the plan ...• "); RABKIN & 
JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 13-1100 (provision in plan permitting investment in contracts 
issued by sponsoring insurance company). These plans even provide for benefit payment in-
kind, namely with the insurance contract. See RABKIN & JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 13-1096 
(provision in split-funded defined benefit prototype plan sold by insurance company permitting 
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the benefits-due lawsuit, especially in the latter fully-funded situation, is 
extremely similar to one for nonpayment on an insurance contract. 
Courts handle lawsuits over insurance contracts generally as legal mat-
ters with the right to a jury trial.288 
2. The remedy for a benefits-due lawsuit is damages 
The remedy most frequently sought by the participant-beneficiary in 
a benefits-due lawsuit is damages, a legal remedy that has a right to a 
jury trial.289 The participant-beneficiary actually seeks either (1) full 
payment, for lump-sum distributions from retirement plans or claims 
from welfare plans;290 (2) the commencement or resumption of payment 
for annuity distributions or disability payments in the future;291 or (3) a 
transfer to participant as optional form of payment life insurance contracts on life and annuity 
contracts); see also VanderMeulen v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 469,470 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1974) (profit-sharing plan bought deferred annuity contract for terminated em-
ployee). Investment powers of the employee benefit plan's trust are generally regulated by 
some state's trust act. Many of those statutes permit investment in insurance contracts. E.g., 
ALA. CoDE § 19-3-125 (Michie 1990) (life, endowment or annuity contracts); CAL. Ctv. 
CoDE § 2261(6) (Deering 1981) (same); IDAHO CoDE § 68-406 (Michie 1990) (same); IND. 
CODE ANN.§ 30-1-5-1(2) (Burns 1990) (same); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 682.23(13) (West 1989) 
(same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.020(1)(i) (Baldwin 1991) (same); see, e.g., TEX. PROP. 
CoDE ANN. § 113.056(b) (West 1991) ("acquire and retain every kind of property"). 
With respect to health and welfare plans, the employer normally pays for them on a pay-
as-you-go basis. LANGBEIN & WoLK, supra note 26, at 70-71. 
288. E.g., Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 101 P.2d 29, 29 (Colo. 1940) (payments 
under disability provision of life insurance policy); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 42 S.W.2d 
584, 587 (Mo. 1931) (death benefit under life insurance policy); Wollums v. Mutual Beneficial 
Health & Accident Ass'n, 46 S.W.2d 259, 262-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) (payments under disa-
bility insurance policy); Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (App. Div. 1969) 
(action to enforce "an annuity contract is an action for a money judgment triable by jury as of 
right"); Schenck v. Prudential Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (same; life insur-
ance policy); Monetta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 115 N.E.2d 845, 846 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1952) (death benefit under life insurance policy); see also Travelers lndem. Co. v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 330 F.2d 250, 258 (9th Cir. 1964) (automobile liability insurance policy); 
Dixie Auto Ins. Co. v. Goudy, 382 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ark. 1964) (same); Fratis v. Fireman's 
Fund Am. Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 339, 341-42, 128 Cal. Rptr. 391, 393 (1976) (same); 
Clayton v. Alliance Mut. Casualty Co., 512 P.2d 507, 517 (K.an.) (same); Jones v. City of 
Kenner, 338 So. 2d 606, 607 (La. 1976) (liability insurance policy); Nassif Realty Corp. v. 
National Fire Ins. Co., 220 A.2d 748, 750 (N.H. 1966) (fire insurance policy); Oltarsh v. Aetna 
Ins. Co., 204 N.E.2d 622, 626 (N.Y. 1965) (public liability insurance policy); American Em-
ployers' Ins. Co. v. McGehee, 485 P.2d 754, 756 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (automobile liability 
insurance policy). 
289. Equity courts could not grant damages. BAKER, supra note 88, at 272-73. Hence, 
litigants sought damages at law, with a jury trial. Id. at 285-86. 
290. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 402, 26 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4)(A) (1988) (pro-
viding for taxation of lump sum distributions from pension plans). 
291. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 205, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1055(d) (1988) (requiring pension benefits in form of qualified joint and survivor annuity 
unless waived). 
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declaration of the right to such payments. 292 Seeking lump-sum pay-
ments clearly would be a legal action. 293 Commencement of payments 
resembles specific performance, typically an equity action, 294 however, 
sometimes insurance law treats such actions as legal with the right to a 
jury trial.295 The right to a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action 
depends on the underlying action, whether if brought it would seek a 
legal or equitable remedy.296 
Under the insurance law analogy, there are nonetheless two legal 
hurdles to overcome in order to characterize the remedy as legal. First, 
the insured under an annuity or disability policy sometimes cannot sue 
for the entire benefit, either as a lump sum or as payments in the future. 
According to the courts, failure to pay some installment payments cur-
rently due, for which the insured can sue, 297 does not bear on the future 
292. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1987). Upon breach of 
an insurance contract, the insured normally has an election of remedies among (1) rescission of 
the contract and a suit in quasi-contract for the value rendered, namely the premiums less the 
cost of coverage, (2) waiting until the time of performance and suing for the entire amount 
due, (3) suing for damages under anticipatory breach, and (4) specific performance. See, e.g., 
Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. v. Week, 9 Ill. App. 358, 361 (1881) (life insurance); Marshall v. Frank-
lin Fire Ins. Co., 35 A. 204, 205 (Pa. 1896) (same); Kerns v. Prudential Ins. Co., 11 Pa. Super. 
209, 212 (1899) (same). 
293. A court would try even an action under trust law, normally tried in equity without a 
right to a jury trial, as a legal action with a jury trial. Trust law recognizes actions for lump-
sum benefits as amounts unconditionally and immediately due and thus legal actions. E.g., 
Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. DiGregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 n.2 (9th Cir. 
1987); Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. Central Nat'! Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983); Ovitz 
v. Jefferies & Co., 553 F. Supp. 300, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see supra note 105. Courts should 
also reject as ridiculous the idea common in the First Circuit that a plan administrator's erro-
neous interpretation of the plan contract thwarts the unconditional requirement of trust law. 
See supra note 164. 
Under insurance law, insureds can recover unpaid amounts due under the policy as legal 
actions. See, e.g., Hines v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 F. Supp. 692, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (at 
law); Menssen v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) (same; future dam-
ages unavailable as too difficult for jury); Wyll v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 483, 
484 (N.D. Tex. 1933) (at law); Cobb v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 565, 571-72, 51 
P.2d 84, 87 (1935) (advisory jury); Brix v. Peoples Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 2d 446, 452-53, 41 
P.2d 537, 540 (1935) (jury trial). 
294. See BAKER, supra note 88, at 273, 279 {discussing performance covenants). 
295. See infra notes 304-09 and accompanying text. 
296. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963). 
297. E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 678 (1936) (disability policy); 
Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 295 U.S. 632, 638 (1935) (same); Hines, 6 F. Supp. at 693 
(same); Menssen, 5 F. Supp. at 116 (same); Wy/1, 3 F. Supp. at 484 (same); Kithcart v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 719, 720 (W.D. Mo. 1932) (same); Cobb, 4 Cal. 2d at 571-72, 
51 P.2d at 87 (same); Brix, 2 Cal. 2d at 455, 41 P.2d at 542 (same); Scott v. Life & Casualty 
Ins. Co., 129 S.E. 903, 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 1925) (health policy); Howard v. Benefit Ass'n ofRy. 
Employees, 39 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ky. 1931) (disability policy); Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Serio, 
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performance.298 This problem does not affect all remedies sought by po-
tential participant-beneficiaries, but only those paid in a form similar to 
annuities. Courts generally state the rule as follows: the doctrine of an-
ticipatory breach, permitting the nonbreacher to treat current breaches 
as a total breach and sue also for total future damages, does not apply to 
unilateral contracts. 299 Almost all insurance contracts are unilateral in 
that either the premiums have been paid, or the premium payment is a 
condition to the insurance company's obligation to pay.300 The above 
formulation is overbroad. This becomes evident when examining the life 
insurance policy cases, which recognize anticipatory breach for a breach 
before the insured's death and permit the insured to sue for future bene-
fits presently. 301 Justice Benjamin Cardozo enunciated the correct rule: 
anticipatory breach lies for unilateral contracts unless the performer acts 
in good faith in not complying with its terms. 302 
157 So. 474, 474 (Miss. 1935) (same); Allen v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 67 S.W.2d 
534-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (same). 
298. Viglas, 291 U.S. at 678. 
299. E.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 254 F.2d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 1958) 
(period-certain annuity contract); Greguhn v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 285, 287 
(Utah 1969) (disability annuity); 1 REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACI'S § 318 (1932). 
300. See 4 CORBIN, supra note 81, § 968, at 880. 
301. E.g., Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal. 2d 94, 104, 142 P.2d 741, 746 
(1943) (future damages for disability contract breached before disabled); Federal Life Ins. Co. 
v. Maxam, 117 N.E. 801, 804-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1917) (cost of replacement for life insurance 
policy); O'Neill v. Supreme Council Am. Legion of Honor, 57 A. 463, 465-66 (N.J. 1904) 
(suggests future damages for life insurance policy); Speer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 36 
Hun. 322, 325 (N.Y. 1885) (present value of replacement less present value of unpaid premi-
ums for life insurance policy); Garland v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 101 S.E. 616, 619 
(N.C. 1919) (policy amount less future premiums for life insurance policy); American Ins. 
Union v. Woodward, 247 P. 398, 399-401 (Okla. 1926) (face value less unpaid premiums for 
life insurance policy); Marshall v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 35 A. 204, 205 (Pa. 1896) (replace-
ment cost for life insurance policy); Kerns v. Prudential Ins. Co., 11 Pa. Super. 209, 212 (1899) 
(same); Supreme Lodge Knights ofPythias v. Neeley, 135 S.W. 1046, 1048-49 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1911) (face value less unpaid premiums discounted for life insurance policy); Mutual Reserve 
Fund Life Ass'n v. Taylor, 37 S.E. 854, 855 (Va. 1901) (suggests future value for life insurance 
policy); Clemmitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 76 Va. 355, 363 (1882) (present value less present 
value of unpaid premiums for life insurance policy); Merrick v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. 
Co., 102 N.W. 593, 595 (Wis. 1905) (uses New York rule for life insurance policy). 
The only jurisdictions denying this rule are New York, overruling its earlier decisions 
recognizing the rule, e.g., Kelly v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 N.E. 584, 585 (N.Y. 1906) 
(since specific performance is available); Langan v. Supreme Council Am. Legion of Honor, 66 
N.E. 932, 933 (N.Y. 1903) (same), and Massachusetts, which has never recognized anticipa-
tory breach, e.g., Porter v. American Legion of Honor, 67 N.E. 238, 239 (Mass. 1903) (life 
insurance); Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 532 (1874) (land transaction). 
302. Viglas, 291 U.S. at 676, 678-81 (good faith; possible for anticipatory repudiation to 
occur). 
Confusion over the correct rule probably arose due to the resistance to the anticipatory 
repudiation doctrine by the influential Samuel Williston, chief reporter of the First Restate-
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With this rule for anticipatory breach, no problem as to the remedy 
sought should arise in the ERISA benefits-due lawsuit since the litigant 
must show abuse of discretion, namely, that the surrogate insurance 
company acted in bad faith. 303 Under insurance law, that showing 
would entitle the participant-beneficiary to sue presently for a lump sum 
payment representing all future payments because of anticipated breach, 
clearly a legal remedy with a right to a jury trial. 
The second problem with characterizing benefits-due lawsuits as 
legal is that some courts have suggested that, for litigants not seeking a 
ment of Contracts. See Samuel Williston, Repudiation of Contracts (pts I & 2), 14 HARV. L. 
REv. 317, 421 (1901); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 59-60 (1974) 
(noting that confusion arose because Williston and Corbin, his chief assistant in drafting First 
Restatement of Contracts, held antithetical points of view); Eric M. Holmes, Anticipatory Re-
pudiation and Insurance Installment Payment Obligations: Anachronistic Application of a Uni· 
form Formula, 40 INs. CoUNSEL J. 396, 397-98 (1973) (noting that doctrine of anticipatory 
repudiation was hostilely received when first enunciated). Williston's position that anticipa-
tory repudiation does not apply to unilateral contracts, 1 REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
§ 318 (1932), is clearly wrong since it fails to explain the life insurance cases. See supra note 
301. Other authors' distinctions between calculable damages for life insurance policies and 
incalculable damages for disability contracts, 4 CORBIN, supra note 81, § 968, at 880; see 
Mabery v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 250 P.2d 824, 828-30 (Kan. 1952) (future damages 
under disability annuity too speculative), and between unconditioned life insurance policies 
and conditioned disability contracts, JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 
§ 12-9 (1987), explain the life insurance cases but fail to explain a major portion of the disabil-
ity contract cases. 
The disability contract cases follow Cardozo's rule. They refuse to apply anticipatory 
breach to situations in which the insurance company failed to perform due to good faith com-
pliance with its understanding of the annuity contract. E.g., United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dempsey, 122 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Ark. 1938) (good faith, no anticipatory breach); Mutual Life 
Ins. Co. v. Holder, 105 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ark. 1937) (relied on terms, no anticipatory breach); 
Industrial Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Buggs, 200 S.E. 537, 539-40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938) (same); 
Moore v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 S.E. 731, 734-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937) (same); Kentucky 
Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 270 S.W.2d 188, 194-95 (Tenn. 1954) (same). In the 
presence of that bad faith, courts find anticipatory breach. E.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty 
Co. v. Klotz, 251 F.2d 499, 504-05 (5th Cir. 1958) (disability, finding anticipatory breach); 
Williams v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 100 F.2d 264, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1938) 
(same); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Pool, 143 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Ark. 1940) (same); Home 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 75 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Ark. 1934) (same); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Gregory, 67 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Ark. 1934) (same); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 912, 
915 (Ark. 1933) (same); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Phifer, 254 S.W. 335, 337 (Ark. 1923) (same); 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lancaster, 180 S.E. 641, 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935) (same); Indiana Life 
Endowment Co. v. Reed, 103 N.E. 77, 80-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1913) (same); Universal Life & 
Accident Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 102 S.W.2d 405, 406-07 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937) (same); Con-
tinental Casualty Co. v. Vaughn, 407 S.W.2d 818, 820-23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (same); Conti-
nental Casualty Co. v. Boerger, 389 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (same); Southland 
Life Ins. Co. v. Gatewood, 115 S.W.2d 723, 727-28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), aff'd, 141 S.W.2d 
588 (Tex. 1940); Needham v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 97 S.W.2d 1016, 1020-21 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1936). 
303. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
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lump sum presently but a compulsion of payments as they come due, the 
court would have to order future benefits. 304 Thus, the remedy is specific 
performance and hence equitable. However, courts are presently work-
ing toward a solution in insurance contract law.305 This solution in-
volves money judgments payable in installments. 306 Installment 
judgments are common practice in civil law jurisdictions. 307 Early in the 
twentieth century several American courts concluded that courts could 
not issue installment money judgments for disability annuities. 308 More 
recently, however, several American courts have permitted such judg-
ments. 309 Thus, a lawsuit for benefits payable in the future can also be a 
legal action seeking a money judgment. 
Under the court's authority in ERISA actions to fashion a federal 
common law of ERISA, 310 the court may use this state law as its 
model.311 
V. CONCLUSION 
Some district courts have suggested that, when the United States 
Supreme Court faces the issue, it will decide in favor of the right to a jury 
trial for benefits-due lawsuits.312 This is especially so in light of the con-
304. E.g., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(ordering of continuing benefits from group health plan is equitable). 
305. See infra note 309 and accompanying text. 
306. See infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text. 
307. German courts may require tortfeasors to pay damages representing decreased earning 
ability for tortious personal injuries in installments. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) art. 843 
(F.R.G.), translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE, AS AMENDED TO JANUARY 1, 1975 {Ian S. 
Forrester et al. trans., 1975). German courts similarly enforce contracts for annuities through 
money judgments payable in installment payments three months in advance. Id. art. 760. 
308. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Simmons, 79 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Ark. 1935) 
(overruling one as judgment would not be certain); Brix v. Peoples Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 
2d 446, 452-53, 41 P.2d 537, 539-40 (1935) (overruling one as not authorized in declaratory 
judgment statute); Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 167 S.E. 38, 42 (N.C. 1932) (same); 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. English, 72 S.W. 58, 59 (fex. 1903) (overruling one as it has never 
been done before). 
309. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 254 F.2d 417, 427 (9th Cir. 1958) (apply-
ing New Mexico law); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 354 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Ky. 1961); 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Goble, 72 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Ky. 1934); Prudential Ins. Co. v. 
Hampton, 65 S.W.2d 980, 983 (Ky. 1933); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Branham, 63 
S.W.2d 498, 500 (Ky. 1933); Melancon v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 So. 346, 348 
(La. 1933); Caporali v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 218, 225 (Wis. 1981). 
310. See supra note 171. 
311. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (under 
LMRA courts are to create uniform federal common law, in which state law is source of 
potentially compatible rules). Cardozo's opinion, see supra note 302, should be a strong indi-
cation of what that federal common law ought to be. Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 457. 
312. Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988). 
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gressionallegislative history indicating that Congress views the benefits-
due lawsuit as contractual, realizes that both state and federal courts 
treated them as contractual under pre-ERISA law, even L¥RA, and ex-
pressly intended to increase the legal remedies under benefits-due law-
suits. Contractual legal remedies require the right to a jury trial. But 
even in the absence of this legislative history, constitutional provisions 
preserving the right to a civil jury trial mandate the jury trial because the 
participant-beneficiary's rights in the benefits-due lawsuit arise under a 
contractual theory and the participant-beneficiary generally seeks a legal 
remedy. Moreover, the only case advanced against the right to a jury 
trial for the benefits-due lawsuit involves erroneous, if not dishonorable, 
obfuscations and cannot properly serve as legal precedent. 
Until the correct decision comes down, some district courts refuse to 
strike the jury demand until the last possible moment in hopes that their 
circuit court will finally revive its legal sensibilities. 313 The federal circuit 
courts should desire to correct the legal error of denying jury trials for 
benefits-due lawsuits. Jury trials permit judges to escape the onus for 
clearly unjust results.314 Judges then could avoid appearing as despots 
permitting an employer, through its hand-picked plan administrator, vin-
dictively to deny a participant-beneficiary a lump-sum benefit because the 
former employee also took the employer's substantial clients to his new 
employer,315 or reduce the benefit because the former employee partici-
pated in a strike against the employer.316 Such an unjust result would be 
the jury's onus317 or, more likely, the jury would sense the injustice and 
decide differently to correct that injustice. 318 And that was what Con-
gress sought in passing ERISA: participant-beneficiaries ought to re-
cover benefits they rightfully are owed. 
313. See Brokke v. Stauffer Chern. Co., 703 F. Supp. 215, 221-22 (D. Conn. 1988) (noting 
that area of law concerning right to jury trial in ERISA action is fluid). 
314. GUINTHER, supra note 92, at 40, 44 (judges have tendency to rigidly follow rule of 
law without regard to doing substantial justice). 
315. Most circuit court opinions appear as cases without real malice between the employer 
and the former employee; however, occasionally there appears a fact pattern that experienced 
ERISA lawyers immediately recognize as a plan administrator decision resulting from the 
improper motives that the abuse of discretion standard should have overturned. But the 
judges blindly apply their version of that rule to enforce the miscarriage of justice. See Denton 
v. First Nat'! Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985) (bank); Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 
1139, 1141 (2d Cir. 1984) (financial printer). 
316. See Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. Pension Trust, 757 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
317. See GUINTHER, supra note 92, at 44 (jury serves as lightning rod to insulate judges 
from public outcry). 
318. Id. at 40 (jury considers matters other than technical legal rules). 
